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This Article tests a model ofjudicial decisionmaking that incorporates elements of both the attitudinal model and the legal model,
along with measures of institutional and judicial background characteristics such as collegiality and trial court experience. We develop a
measure of interpretive philosophy relying primarily on judicial opinions, which we code for certain indicators of traditional interpretive
approaches (i.e., the use of interpretive tools). The critical question is
whether judges with similar interpretive philosophies are more likely
to agree with one another when deciding cases. Our general finding
is that ideology and interpretive

philosophy are not significant

predictors of agreement. Instead, experience on the bench together
is a significant predictor of agreement, supporting the conclusion that
judging is more about pragmatic problem solving and maintaining a
collegial work environment. While further testing of the importance
of the legal model is certainly warranted, our findings suggest that at
least some of the sharp interpretive disagreements among academics
are not reflected in the actual business of judging.
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INTRODUCTION

"[J]udges' decisions," according to one scholar, "are a function of
what they prefer to do, tempered by what they think they ought to do,
but constrained by what they perceive is feasible to do."'1 Judges on
the federal courts of appeals typically agree with one another. The
vast majority of decisions are unanimous. But why, in a minority of

cases, do they disagree? One explanation, a legal realist explanation,
is that judges have different political or policy views. While some
judges are more liberal and others more conservative, the judicial selection process insures that most judges are not too far from the ideological mainstream. Moreover, winning coalitions in Congress are
typically bipartisan and much larger than a simple majority.' Therefore, judges should generally agree with one another, although their
ideological differences will occasionally cause disagreement in the
form of concurrences or dissents. Another explanation for disagreement, a more traditional one, is that judges have different approaches
or philosophies toward legal interpretation. Some judges are more
formalist or originalist, while others are less so. For the traditionalist,
these interpretive differences are the real stuff of judicial disagreement. Judging, however, may be about both ideological and interpretive commitments. What judges consider preferable, proper, and
feasible is likely based on their views of good policy and good legal
interpretation.
In this Article, we consider the role ofjudges' interpretive philosophies from an empirical perspective.' We focus on two basic questions: First, how can we measure or operationalize the interpretive
philosophy of judges? Second, how can we test the importance of interpretive philosophy in judicial decisionmaking? For decades, political scientists have devoted most of their efforts to measuring ideology,
particularly the ideology of Supreme Court Justices, with mixed results.4 Much less work has been devoted to measuring judges' inter1. James L. Gibson, From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study of
Judicial Behavior, 5 POL. BEHAV. 7, 9 (1983).

2. The average size of the winning coalition for all laws enacted by the 102nd and
103rd Congresses (1991-1994) is seventy-nine percent. KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS

6 (1998).
3. We do not mean to suggest that traditional legal scholarship is inherently nonempirical. A doctrinal analysis is often a qualitative, "small n" study. But in legal scholarship, the term "empirical" is often used to distinguish traditional doctrinal work from
quantitative work. We simply follow this common usage.
4. E.g., DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 63-64
(2002); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED

(2002); DONALD R.

SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE

UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 103-04 (2000); Lee Epstein & Carol Mershon, Measuring
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pretive views. 5 This lack of attention is somewhat surprising. Judges
are much more explicit in their opinions about their interpretive
views than their ideological views, thereby providing more raw material for constructing measures of judges' interpretive philosophies.
Since legal scholars are now active participants in empirical discussions of judicial decisionmaking, there should be more interest in
evaluating the role of traditional interpretive approaches in the decisionmaking process.
Understanding the role of judges' interpretive views is not a
purely academic exercise. Assuming interpretive differences matter,

we would like to know the costs and benefits of various approaches to
legal interpretation. For example, might formalism and bright line
rules reduce litigation costs by making the law more predictable?
Does originalism force the legislature to make costly corrections to
statutes, corrections the judiciary might more efficiently handle? The
federal judiciary offers thirteen 'jurisprudential laboratories" for considering questions like these,6 but before we can compare and evaluate different interpretive approaches, we must determine whether we
can measure their use-or whether empiricists who study legal interpretation are chasing phantoms even to try.
PoliticalPreferences, 40 AM. J. POL. ScI. 261 (1996); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the
United States Courts of Appeals, 1961-1964, 60 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 374 (1966);Jeffrey A. Segal
& Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme CourtJustices, 83 AM. POL.
Sci. REv.557 (1989); Michael W. Giles et al., Measuring the Preferences of Federal Judges:
Alternatives to Party of the Appointing President (June 11, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors); Christopher Zorn & Gregory A. Caldeira, Bias and Heterogeneity in a Media-Based Measure of Supreme Court Preferences (Feb. 15, 2003)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.polisci.umn.edu/conferences/judicial/
papers/zorn.pdf.
5. For notable exceptions involving stare decisis, see Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B.
Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin's Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156 (2005); HAROLD J. SPAETH &JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MI-

(1999). For an exception involving textualism and originalism, see Robert M. Howard &Jeffrey A. Segal, An
OriginalLook at Originalism, 36 LAw & Soc'y REV. 113 (2002). For other empirical tests of
the legal model, see DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAw 131-43 (2003);
Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, The Influence ofJurisprudentialConsiderationson Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict Cases, 40 LAW & Soc'x REv. 135 (2006); Sara
C. Benesh & Jason J. Czarnezki, The Ideology of Legal Interpretation (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors); Sara C. Benesh & HaroldJ. Spaeth, What Explains Dissensus? A Test of the Legal and Attitudinal Models (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
authors). See also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent:A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976).
6. Cf New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
NORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
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This Article is organized as follows: In Part I, we discuss why legal
scholars ought to empirically evaluate interpretive approaches. In
Part II, we describe the dominant models of judicial decisionmaking,
the legal model and the attitudinal model. In Part III, we describe
our combined model and explain the research methodology and data
for this study. Part IV analyzes the judicial voting patterns of Seventh
Circuit judges and addresses whether agreement between two judges
on a three-judge panel can be explained by a variety ofjudicial characteristics, including both ideological and legal interpretive factors.
Part V contains our results. Part VI suggests directions for future
research.
I.

THE NEED FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS IN LEGAL INTERPRETATION

Scholars interested in legal interpretation are becoming more serious about empiricism. According to Gregory Sisk and Michael
Heise, "empirical legal scholarship on judicial decisionmaking [has]
emerged from obscurity to become the subject of disputation in a
larger societal or academic arena."7 This new interest in legal empiricism on the part of legal scholars has occurred despite the doctrinal
emphasis in legal training.8 While legal scholars and political scientists have yet to make significant progress in empirically testing the
consequences of various interpretive approaches, more and more
scholars are forcefully arguing that theorists must be attentive to the
costs and benefits of the various interpretive alternatives that they consider.9 We refer to these alternatives in the broadest sense, including
both general and specific interpretive approaches. Whether judges
should prefer formalism or nonformalism would qualify as fairly general. Whether judges should rely upon the use of dictionaries is fairly
specific. The list of possible alternatives is long, and the choices made
by judges may have real consequences.

7. Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates
About Statistical Measures, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 743, 745 (2005); see also Michael Heise, The
Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REv. 807 (1999).
8. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, Across the Great Divide (Between Law & PoliticalScience), 3
GREEN BAG 2D 267, 268 (2000) ("While [legal academics'] desire to reach out to other
disciplines, questions, and modes of analysis is commendable, on the whole they have done
so without the knowledge or training necessary to do it well.").
9. E.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Legal Scholarship in the Age of Legislation, 34 TULSA L. J. 679,
687 (1999); see Cass R. Sunstein, Must FormalismBe Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REv.
636, 641, 669 (1999) (arguing that formalism must be defended pragmatically and suggesting that one must look at the mistakes and injustices possibly caused by a formalist
judiciary).
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This Part addresses the importance of empirical analysis in legal
interpretation and considers some key questions about interpretation
that need empirical answers. While existing scholarship does not go
far enough in telling us how one might test empirical questions about
legal interpretation, it does make clear that empiricism offers important opportunities to answer critical questions about the costs and
benefits of various interpretive strategies.
A.

Are Normative Arguments Sufficient?

Many issues of legal interpretation are intertwined with normative concerns. While we certainly do not question the value of normative contributions to the study of legal interpretation, empirical
research remains valuable for two reasons. First, normative arguments
can only take us so far. Defenders of originalism, for example, argue
that for reasons of democratic theory, judges must interpret the law
according to its original meaning." ° Suppose we agree. How do we
measure the original meaning? Which is more likely to reveal it, the
canons of construction, dictionaries, or legislative history? Are some
originalist approaches less costly than others? Similar questions could
be raised about non-originalist interpretive methods, most of which
are difficult to answer without empirical work. Legal philosophers are
interested in the law both as it is and as it ought to be. 1 Empirical
work can assist with both projects.
Second, when normative discussions are at an impasse, empirical
findings may provide the only basis for reaching agreement. The theoretical arguments on many issues of legal interpretation are well developed, and many people are strongly committed to their positions.
But if a particular interpretive approach turns out to be more costly
than the alternative, its defenders might reevaluate their commitments. 2 If originalism is a very costly methodology-maybe because
the courts would need a platoon of political scientists and historians
to achieve originalist outcomes-we might want to consider making a
democratic commitment to something other than originalism, depending upon the costs of the alternatives.

10. E.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MA-rTER OF INTERPRETATION 12-14 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997).
11. ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 1 (rev. 2d ed. 2005).
12. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 672 (1999); Sunstein, supra note 9, at 643 ("[W]ith imaginable
empirical findings, both formalists and antiformalists should be flexible enough to move in
the direction of their apparent adversaries.").
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The Relevant Questions

Focusing on formalism in particular, Cass Sunstein argues that
the tools of legal interpretation must be empirically defended and
suggests what results must be empirically identified in order for formalism to be considered a beneficial judicial strategy."3 While he
does not offer any methods for finding these answers and mounting
this defense, if his optimism in empiricism is realized, many disagreements over interpretive methods or tools might be resolved by the
empirical findings. 4
Empirical work may help us choose interpretive tools by providing a common basis for agreement, 15 provided we can figure out how
to answer the important questions about interpretive approaches like
formalism. In order to determine the merits of formalism or
nonformalism-or the ideal point between the two extremes-we
need to know whether a formalist or nonformalist judiciary will produce more mistakes; whether legislatures can anticipate and correct
mistakes at a relatively low cost; and whether a nonformalist judiciary
will be unpredictable, increasing the decision costs for the legal system. 6 We think these questions are susceptible to empirical study.
However, we currently lack "the sort of analysis required to assess the
empirical claims of those using statutory interpretation to improve
t7
legislative decisionmaking."
What is likely to happen on the judicial side of the relationship
when courts adopt particular interpretive approaches? We need to
ask "how actual judges would use any proposed approach, and to investigate the possibility that an otherwise appealing approach will have

13. Sunstein, supra note 9, at 641.
14. Sunstein hypothesizes "that it is disagreement over the underlying empirical issues-not over large concepts of any kind-that principally separates formalists and
nonformalists." Id. at 642; accord Eskridge, supra note 12, at 672 (suggesting reluctantly
that "[s]ubjecting theories of statutory interpretation to systematic factual testing . . .
should be potentially attractive to both formalists and pragmatists [because such]
[e]mpirical work might expand arenas of consensus among scholars and judges about the
latter's appropriate role and reasoning in statutory cases").
15. See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 643 ("Doesn't the choice between the competing approaches depend on predictive judgments about which a great deal remains to be learned?
Don't the relevant disagreements turn, in large part, on those judgments?").
16. Id. at 641; accord Garrett, supra note 9, at 681, 686-87. The answers relate to the
question of how rigorously courts should enforce statutory provisions that produce outcomes the legislature would probably not have wanted. Or might forcing an absurd outcome encourage legislatures to draft statutes more carefully?
17. Garrett, supra note 9, at 687.
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unfortunate dynamic effects on private and public institutions,""I and
what are the consequences of using certain interpretive tools.1 9 Many
of these questions can be addressed empirically.2" Legal scholars have
even studied a few of these questions. 21 While a roadmap for actually
addressing these questions does not yet exist, at least scholars are formulating the right questions.22
II.

MODELS OF JUDicIAL BEHAVIOR

Political scientists speak of two basic models ofjudicial behavior:
the legal model and the attitudinal model. 23 As defined by political
scientists, the legal model refers to traditional interpretive approaches
familiar to lawyers, such as the language of legal texts (e.g., contracts,
statutes, and constitutions), precedent, canons of construction, the intent of the framers, and legislative history. 4 A common thread
18. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions 1 (Univ. of Chicago Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 28, 2002), available at http://ssm.com/rom.abstractid=320245.
19. See Eskridge, supra note 12, at 680 (suggesting that one might look at the differences in decisions when decisionmakers are provided only with specific canons, versus the
more general guidance that might be available through legislative history, and considering
whether the legislature is even aware of the canons and whether some canons are better
than others).
20. Some interpretive arguments depend upon the possibility of empirical measurement. E.g., Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation,68 U. CHI. L. REv. 149
(2001). Vermeule argues that the interpretive strategies used by courts may cycle, depending upon the behavior of other actors. Id. at 150-51. Courts, in reaction to the legislature's
propensity to manipulate legislative history, may alternate between following and not following it. The legislature, in reaction to the courts' interpretive rule for legislative history,
may alternate between manipulating and not manipulating it. Id. at 167-68. Yet he admits
that he is unable to confirm whether any cycling is actually occurring. Id. at 182-83. The
model depends, however, upon the ability ofjudges to detect manipulation in the legislative history and upon the ability of legislators to identify the prevailing interpretive rule for
it, meaning that judges and legislators could determine whether cycling is occurring. Id. at
167-68. But if scholars cannot determine whether cycling is occurring, it is unclear how
judges or legislators could do so.
21. For a study of how often and under what conditions Congress is apt to override the
Supreme Court's construction of a federal statute, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991).
22. While legal scholars have raised the relevant questions, some have suggested these
questions cannot be answered. E.g., Eskridge, supra note 12, at 672-73; Adrian Vermeule,
Interpretation,Empiricism, and the ClosureProblem, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 698, 699-700 (1999). For
an example of mild skepticism about empirical findings while recognizing that empirical
evidence is beneficial when available, see Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms,
108 YALE L.J. 573, 573-74 (1998).
23. E.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 4, at 44. A third model is the separation of powers
model. Id. at 103-10. Under this model, courts act to prevent legislative overrides of their
decisions that will result in policies further from their ideal points than strategic alternatives that are irreversible under the legislatures' existing ideal points. Id. at 105.
24. Id. at 48.
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among these sources is that each is external to ajudge's personal preferences or political views. 25 The attitudinal model, on the other
hand, is essentially the political science version of legal realism, where
judges "decide[ ] disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-a-vis
[their] ideological attitudes and values."26 While the legal model assumes an almost mechanical form of jurisprudence, the attitudinal
model represents the opposite extreme, suggesting that ideology
alone determines judicial outcomes. Indeed, the frequent protests of
Supreme CourtJustices that they do not or must not make policy 27 are
matched by some political scientists' complaints that legal arguments
are deceptions.2" Standing alone, neither model captures what most
legal scholars think influences judicial decisionmaking. Recently, political scientists have begun to give more attention to the legal model,
and legal scholars have begun to give more empirical attention to the
role of ideology.2 9 Nevertheless, much work remains to be done in
developing and testing a model that incorporates ideological and legal influences. Both types of influences have strong backing in the
theoretical literature on legal interpretation and deserve careful
testing.
A.

Combining the Legal and Attitudinal Models

The theoretical literature on legal interpretation offers strong
support for a model combining elements of both the attitudinal and
25. Id. at 49. Contra Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudenceof Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REv.
827, 828 (1988) ("[T]he answers [to many legal questions] depend on the policy judgments, political preferences, and ethical values of the judges, or (what is not clearly distinct) on dominant public opinion acting through the judges, rather than on legal
reasoning regarded as something different from policy, or politics, or values, or public
opinion.").
26. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 4, at 86; accord Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting
on Federal Courts of Appeals: A PreliminaryInvestigation,90 VA. L. REv. 301, 309 (2004); Cass
Sunstein, The Right-Wing Assault, AM. PROSPEcT, Mar. 1, 2003, at A2, availableat http://www.
prospect.org/print/V1 4/3/sunstein-c.html.
27. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) ("We do not sit as a superlegislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic
problems, business affairs, or social conditions."); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824) ("Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of
giving effect to the will of the Judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of
the Legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law.").
28. E.g., Harold J. Spaeth & Stuart H. Teger, Activism and Restraint:A Cloakfor theJustices'Policy Preferences, in STUDIES IN U.S. SUPREME COURT BEHAVIOR 221 (HaroldJ. Spaeth &
Saul Brenner eds., 1990).
29. E.g., CAss R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENr 166-67 (2003); Howard Gillman & Cornell W. Clayton, Introduction to SUPREME COURT DECISION MAING 1, 1-12 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); Howard & Segal, supra note 5; Richard L.
Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REv. 1717 (1997).
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legal models. The most basic reason is linguistic indeterminacy. To
varying degrees, judges must exercise discretion or judgment in applying the law to many situations that are poorly described or not even
considered by the legislature.3 ° Despite the recognition that interpretation is not a mechanical enterprise, judges are not at sea in interpreting legal texts. Judges should be "faithful" to the text and not
force "extraneous matter" into it,3 but be willing to abandon faithful
'
interpretations if it would "slaughter justice. "32
These basic points, noted by Francis Lieber, are ones that most
legal scholars would consider sound. Legal texts are not completely
determinate. To varying degrees, they have gaps.33 Gaps in the texts
are easy and sometimes necessary entry points for judges' policy preferences. And at some point, even a relatively determinate meaning
should be abandoned. Not surprisingly, there is significant disagreement over when to depart from a clear meaning. For some, the
touchstone might be absurdity. For others, it might be to avoid injustice or terrible consequences. Nearly everyone would agree that a
clear meaning should be abandoned if it would transform the law into
a "suicide pact." 4
B.

The Legal Model

There is no canonical definition of the legal model or legal interpretation, but we cannot measure something called "interpretive philosophy" unless we can give meaning to the concept. As an initial
matter, we can be clear about what we do not mean by the term interpretive philosophy. We do not refer to judges' views on issues of epistemology. Like most people, most judges probably do not give much
thought to this topic. We also do not refer to certain high-level legal
questions confronted by legal philosophers.3" A comprehensive understanding of legal interpretation might require consideration of
these questions, but we do not think these issues are closely related to
30. FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 121-22 (1839)

(recognizing

that interpreting legal texts inevitably requires some degree of "construction" because legislatures "cannot foresee all possible complex cases").
31. Id. at 144.
32. Id. at 115.
33. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO,THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921).

34. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) ("[W]hile the
Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact."); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) Uackson, J.,dissenting) ("There is danger that,
if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.").
35. See, e.g.,
BRIAN Bix, JURISPRUDENCE 38-41 (1996) (discussing John Austin's "command theory" of law and H.L.A. Hart's rule of recognition).
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judicial decisionmaking at the "ground level." We think of a judge's
interpretive philosophy as something like a congressperson's political
philosophy. A philosophy, in our sense, is a package of beliefs about
how to do a job responsibly. For a judge, this job is to interpret the
law.
These packages of beliefs go by several names. Formalism and
originalism are two of the most common, but they do not define the
entire list. We can also add textualism, realism, and strict constructionism. Judge Frank Easterbrook has also suggested the term "legalist," which is, perhaps, someone who practices legalism. 6 Several of
these categories, such as formalism, textualism, and strict constructionism, often blur together, and it is unlikely that each of these terms
represents a different dimension of real-world judicial behavior.3 7
Congressional behavior is well explained by a single liberal-conservative dimension," so it would be quite surprising if judicial behavior
falls along six or more dimensions.39 Some commentators argue that
formalism, or at least particular types of formalism, even fail to describe any real-world judicial behavior.4 ° The descriptions of judicial
decisionmaking offered by Chief Justice John Marshall in Osborn v.
Bank of the United States" and Justice Owen Roberts in United States v.
36. Howard Bashman, How Appealing's 20 Questions Site, 20 Questions for Circuit
Judge Frank H. Easterbrook of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Aug. 2,
2004), http://www.legalaffairs.org/howappealing/20q/2004-08-01-20q-appellateblog_
archive.hutl.
37. For a related discussion along these lines, see Lawrence B. Solum, JudicialSelection:
Ideology Versus Character,26 CARozo L. REv. 659, 666-72 (2005).
38. KEITH T. POOLE & HowARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-EcoNoMic HISTORY
OF ROLL CALL VOTING 27-28, 53-54 (1997). Poole and Rosenthal actually prefer two dimensions, but the additional dimension offers only a small improvement. Id.
39. But see Stephen Reinhardt, JudicialSpeech and the Open Judiciary,28 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
805, 809 (1995) ("Judicial philosophies are as diverse as the judges themselves.").
40. See RicHARD A. POSNER, LAw, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 19 & n.21 (2003) (discussing the formalist delusion that "all responsible legal professionals outgrew... a long
time ago," but suggesting thatJustice Scalia may be an exception); Thomas C. Grey, Hear
the Other Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal Theory, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1569, 1590
(1990) ("1 am convinced that pragmatism is the implicit working theory of most good
lawyers."); Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry ofJustice, 63 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1811, 1811 (1990) ("I think it is true that by now pragmatism is banal in its application
to law. I also suspect that [Thomas] Grey is right when he claims that 'pragmatism is the
implicit working theory of most good lawyers.' To that extent, at least, everybody seems to
now be a legal realist." (footnote omitted)).
41. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). The Court notes,
Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the power of the laws, has no existence. Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When
they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to
be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law; and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the Court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised
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Butler,42 for example, both suggest implausible versions of formalism.
But these versions of formalism do not interest us. The goal, of
course, is to identify plausible approaches to legal interpretation,
whether the approach is labeled formalism or something else.
Three general questions seem to animate much of the discussion
about legal interpretation: whether to prefer rules and predictability
or standards and discretion; the proper use, if any, of extra-textual
sources; and the amount of deference owed to the original meaning
of the law. Cass Sunstein's definition of formalism captures the first
two questions, while common definitions of originalism capture the
third. According to Sunstein, formalist approaches include the following commitments: "to promoting compliance with all applicable
legal formalities (whether or not they make sense in the individual
case), to ensuring rule-bound law (even if application of the rule, statutory or contractual, makes little sense in the individual case), and to
constraining the discretion of judges in deciding cases."43
While other scholars would offer different definitions of formalism,4 4 there is likely more agreement about the meaning of originalism. Keith Whittington describes "the critical originalist directive" as
the position that "the Constitution should be interpreted according to
the understandings made public at the time of the drafting and ratifi-

for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge; always for the purpose of
giving effect to the will of the Legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law.
Id. at 866.
42. 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936) ("When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the
courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the Government has only one duty-to lay the article of the CONSTITUTION which is invoked beside
the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter SQUARES with the
former.").
43. Sunstein, supra note 9, at 638-39.
44. See, e.g.,JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 101 (1930); Richard A. Posner,
Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretationof Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 179, 181 (1986) ("I want [formalism] to mean the use of deductive logic to
derive the outcome of a case from premises accepted as authoritative. Formalism enables a
commentator to pronounce the outcome of the case as being correct or incorrect, in approximately the same way that the solution to a mathematical problem can be pronounced
correct or incorrect."); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) ("At the
heart of the word 'formalism,' in many of its numerous uses, lies the concept of decisionmaking according to rule."); Mark Tushnet &JenniferJaff, CriticalLegal Studies and Criminal
Procedure, 35 CATH. U. L. REv. 361, 361 (1986) ("We define legal formalism as the position
which claims that results in any particular case are in some nontrivial sense determined by
a set of general principles."); see also Sunstein, supra note 9, at 638 ("It is not easy to define
the term 'formalism,' partly because there is no canonical kind of formalism." (footnote
omitted)).
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cation. 45 While Whittington's focus is on constitutional interpretation, the same principle applies to statutory interpretation.4 6
Given these definitions, it is theoretically plausible to think of formalism and originalism as two important yet distinct aspects of the
legal model, ones that should largely capture the ideas of textualism
and other approaches as well. Although Sunstein does reference deduction and mechanistic decisionmaking, somewhat echoing Chief
Justice Marshall's and Justice Roberts's unpersuasive descriptions of
judging,4 7 formalism can be considered not as a method for completely eliminating discretion or extra-textual sources, but as a preference for rules over standards and as a preference for the text of the
law over other sources. Originalism can be seen as a preference for
the original meaning of the law, regardless of whether this meaning
involves rules or standards and regardless of whether the original
meaning is sought in the text, dictionaries, legislative history, or elsewhere. These preferences can be relatively stronger or weaker from
judge to judge and still remain achievable in the real world ofjudging.
Pragmatism is best understood not as a distinct alternative to formalism or originalism, but as a sort of legal centrism. Pragmatism is
theory blunted. Judge Richard Posner describes it as a "middle way"
between formalism and realism in particular,4 8 but it can also be seen
as a middle way between originalism and non-originalism. 49 It emphasizes "the primacy of consequences,"5 "reasonableness," 51 and using
"common sense to resolve problems. '52 Hence, pragmatism is not a
separate dimension of interpretation, but a mid-range on whatever
other dimensions are important, whether these dimensions are formalism, originalism, or something else. A pragmatist, for example, is
not wholly unconcerned about original meaning, but pragmatists will
be more likely to balance originalist goals with other goals.5 3 At least
in theory, one pragmatist could be relatively more or less formalist or
originalist than another pragmatist, 54 but pragmatism makes dull the

45. KEITH E. WHrIINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 35 (1999).
46. E.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1997).

47. Sunstein, supra note 9, at 638-39.
48. RicHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 4 (1995).
49. Id. at 252-53 (discussing pragmatism as an alternative to strict originalism).
50. Id. at 252.
51. POSNER, supra note 40, at 59.

52. Id. at 52.
53. See POSNER, supranote 48, at 252-53 (noting that pragmatists place greater emphasis
on the consequences of their decisions than originalists).
54. See POSNER, supra note 40, at 19 (noting that a pragmatist may "embrace formalism
as a pragmatic strategy rather than just as a pragmatic rhetoric").
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sharper edges of interpretive theory so commonly advocated in academic discussions of legal interpretation.
Making sense of legal interpretation in theory is not the same as
making sense of it in practice. Too little is known about judges' actual
interpretive commitments. Too little is also known about how commitments to formalism or originalism affect the choice of common
interpretive tools, such as the use of dictionaries, canons of construction, or legislative history. In theory, an originalist can be formalist or
nonformalist. Using Sunstein's terminology, hard originalists attempt
to derive rules from the original meaning of the law. Soft originalists
attempt to derive standards from it.55 In Sunstein's terms, "hard" and
"soft" essentially refer to formalism and nonformalism, respectively. A
hard originalist would presumably be less likely to rely on legislative
history than a soft originalist. But suppose a judge dislikes legislative
history. It might be because the judge is relatively non-originalist. Or
it might be because the judge is relatively formalist. To take another
example, do some judges like dictionaries because they believe dictionaries track the original meaning of the law or because dictionaries
make the law more predictable by tying interpretation to publicly accepted definitions? We simply lack enough information aboutjudges'
actual interpretive philosophies to predict which justification is more
common or to explain how the many elements of the legal model all
fit together. Instead, we have only a rough understanding, based on
conflicting theories, of common elements of legal interpretation. In
addition to operational definitions of the various interpretive tools, we
also need an empirical account of how these tools fit together in
practice.
C.

The Attitudinal Model

The attitudinal model of judicial decisionmaking in political sci-

ence is several decades old. Among political scientists, Herman
Pritchett is often credited as the pioneering force behind the study of
judicial behavior.5 6 He approached judicial behavior both empirically
and "realistically," recognizing that, at least in some cases, "the private
55. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 173-75 (1996)

(discussing "hard originalism" as an attempt to make constitutional and statutory interpretation rulelike).
56. See Lawrence Baum, C. Hermann Pritchett:Innovatorwith an Ambiguous Legacy, inTHE
PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 57 (Nancy Maveety ed., 2003); see also C. HERMAN PRITCH-

1937-1947 (1948);
C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of OpinionAmong Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939-1941,
35 Am.POL. Sci. REV. 890 (1941). For a discussion of the distinction between behavioralism and attitudinalism, see Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal
ETr, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES
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attitudes of the majority of the Court. .. become public law."57 Glendon Schubert, however, receives the credit for developing and testing
the attitudinal model,5" with additional credit going to David Rohde
and Harold Spaeth for making important contributions to the model
in terms of both theory and evidence.5 9 The leading discussion of the
model is now contained in Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth's The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited, an updated edition of
their earlier book.
Segal and Spaeth focus on the U.S. Supreme Court in developing
and testing the attitudinal model, not the courts of appeals. They describe the Justices as rational actors who make decisions based on
their personal goals, the formal and informal rules in which the Justices operate, and the various situations in which the opportunities for
decisions arise.6 ° They describe the Justices' goals as policy goals.6 1
What makes the Supreme Court different from most other courts for
the pursuit of policy goals is the control exercised by the Court over
its own docket.6 2 Segal and Spaeth describe this institutional rule as
"requisite" for the Justices to vote their preferences.6" Unlike lower
court judges, the Justices are able to avoid "meritless cases," ones that
do not have plausible legal arguments on both sides.6 4 But the Justices are not without some constraints in acting on their preferences.
Segal and Spaeth recognize some obvious limitations, such as the
opinion-writing stage. In order to produce a majority opinion, the
Justices must sometimes accommodate other Justices who have different policy goals.6 5
While bargaining may affect the ability of the Justices to achieve
their desired policy, Segal and Spaeth find that the Justices' policy
preferences are excellent predictors of their final votes on the merScholarship:JudicialDecisionMaking and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 833, 836
(2002).
57. Pritchett, supra note 56, at 890.
58. SeeJeffrey A. Segal, Glendon Schubert: TheJudicialMind, in THE PIONEERS OFJUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR, supra note 56, at 78, 87-88. See generally GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1959); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND (1965);
GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED (1974).
59. DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (1976).
60. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 4, at 92-97.
61. Id. at 92.
62. Id. at 93.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 387-98; see also LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 1-9
(1998) (discussing the Justices' strategic options in the case of Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976)).
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its, 6 6

arguing that "Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he was
extremely liberal."6 7 Despite the success of the attitudinal model, Segal and Spaeth's dataset is limited to civil liberties cases and search
and seizure cases. 6" The attitudinal model may be limited in its application to other cases, 69 and it may be limited in its application to the
courts of appeals.7"
Studies do offer some support for the application of the attitudinal model to the courts of appeals,7" but significant questions remain
about how well it explains decisionmaking outside of the Supreme
Court. One critical difference between the Supreme Court and the
lower courts is their lack of control over their dockets. The courts of
appeals cannot "cherry pick" the hard cases where strong legal arguments can be mustered on both sides, which are the cases where
judges have the greatest opportunity to make purely policy-based decisions. Moreover, a greater portion of the Supreme Court's docket includes cases that are ideologically divisive or that are difficult to

answer through the conventional approaches of legal interpretation.
Nevertheless, a substantial percentage of the Supreme Court's decisions are still unanimous, ranging from 29.6% to 43.0% during the
1994 to 2003 terms, with an average during this period of 35.5%.72

Perhaps even the Supreme Court receives a fair share of legally easy
cases. Whether or not these cases are easy or there is some other reason for unanimity in these cases, easy cases should be more common
at the intermediate appellate level, suggesting that traditional legal
considerations should matter more in the courts of appeals. The solution is to develop and test a model of appellate decisionmaking that
combines both legal and attitudinal elements.

66. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 4, at 312-26.
67. Id. at 86.
68. Id. at 322-26.
69. See Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of the U.S. Supreme Court
Justices Revisited, 57 J. POLITICS 812 (1995) (extending prior research to additional Justices
and to economics cases).
70. Cf C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS 145-48 (1996) (arguing that the attitudinal model is the least applicable to trial
court judges).
71. E.g., KLEIN, supra note 4, at 15; SONGER ET AL., supra note 4, at 103; Goldman, supra
note 4; Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69
AM. POL. ScI. REv. 491 (1975); Donald R. Songer & Susan Haire, IntegratingAlternative
Approaches to the Study ofJudicial Voting: Obscenity Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 36 Am.J.
POL. ScI. 963 (1992); Donald R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy ofJustice: Testing a PrincipalAgent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. Sci. 673 (1994).
72. Nine Justices, Ten Years: A Statistical Retrospective, 118 HARV. L. REv. 510, 520 tbl.IV
(2004).
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY

The Court and the Judges

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit covers
the states of Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin, with most of its business
conducted in Chicago.7 3 This study concerns itself with sixteen current and former judges on the Seventh Circuit including those listed
below. Prior to appointment on the Seventh Circuit, some of these
judges were federal district court judges, state supreme court judges,
state trial judges, academics, and many of them, at one time, were in
private practice. Table 1 lists the judges.
TABLE
Thomas F. Fairchild
Walter Cummings
William J. Bauer
Harlington Wood, Jr.
Richard D. Cudahy
Richard A. Posner
John L. Coffey
Joel M. Flaum

(Johnson, 1966)
(Johnson, 1966)
(Ford,1974)
(Ford,1976)
(Carter, 1979)
(Reagan,1981)
(Reagan,1982)
(Reagan,1983)

B.

1
Frank H. Easterbrook
Kenneth F. Ripple
Daniel A. Manion
Michael S. Kanne
Ilana Diamond Rovner
Diane P. Wood
Terence T. Evans
Ann Claire Williams

(Reagan, 1985)
(Reagan, 1985)
(Reagan, 1986)
(Reagan, 1987)
(Bush, 1992)
(Clinton, 1995)
(Clinton, 1995)
(Clinton, 1999)

The Cases

The cases on which we test our model-the cases represented by
our dependent variable-are the non-unanimous decisions decided
by the Seventh Circuit during the 1997 through 2003 terms (defined
as August 1, 1997 to July 31, 2003), meaning cases that include some
sort of concurring or dissenting opinion(s). Less than ten percent of
all the cases decided in this time period are non-unanimous. 74 We do
not include cases decided en banc, cases where the opinion was vacated by the court, dissents from denials of rehearing or rehearing en
banc, dissents from petitions for rehearing or stay, or cases where
Judge Jesse Eschbach participated (because he participated in so few
cases in the selected terms). The dependent variable is not the outcome of these cases, but whether each pair of judges on the threejudge panels agreed in the outcome. For each case, there are three
73. The Seventh Circuit is often ranked as one of most respected circuits in the country. See 2 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, 7th Circuit 1 (2005) ("Lawyers interviewed
ranked the Seventh Circuit as one of the top circuits in the country."); William M. Landes
et al., JudicialInfluence: A CitationAnalysis of FederalCourts ofAppeals Judges, 27J. LEGAL STUD.
271, 303-04 (1998) (ranking the Seventh Circuit highest among the circuits for outsidecircuit citations and total citations).
74. See infra tbl.3.
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judges and three pairings or dyads ofjudges. As there are 324 cases in
the dependent variable dataset, there are 972 observations. It is on
these observations that we test our measure of interpretive
philosophy.
Because we use only non-unanimous cases, our conclusions are
necessarily limited. Scholars have shown that unanimous cases can
mask disagreement among judges and may sometimes give the misleading impression that a particular case is "easy."'75 While there are
no doubt exceptions, perhaps where a collegial judge defers to his or
her more interested colleagues, many unanimous cases are likely easy
(or at least easier than the non-unanimous cases) 76 either because the
outcomes are clearly resolved by precedent or because the judges' policy preferences on the issue are similar. Regardless, it eludes us how
to test whether agreement in a unanimous cases is based on legal or
policy preferences, absent candid participant statements or more sophisticated information about the judges' preferences.
C. Methodology
Our model of judicial decisionmaking employs the following independent variables: (1) ideological distance between two judges, (2)
"interpretive" distance between two judges, (3) trial court experience
by one or both judges, (4) judicial collegiality defined by the number
of terms the two judges served together on the court at the time the
decision was made, and (5) case type. Agreement between a dyad of
two judges, our dependent variable, is a function of our independent
variables. We will address each of these variables in turn, explaining
how we will operationalize each one in an effort to create measures
that are both valid and reliable.
75. See, e.g., DANIEL R. PINELLO, THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL-SELECTION METHOD ON STATESUPREME-COURT POLICY 25 (1995) (finding that two state supreme courts voted without
dissent but reached opposite conclusions on identical legal issues in fourteen of thirty-six
instances); Burton M. Atkins & Justin J. Green, Consensus on the United States Courts of Appeals: Illusions or Reality?, 20 AM. J. POL. Sci. 735 (1976); Donald R. Songer, Consensual and
Nonconsensual Decisions in Unanimous Opinions of the United States Courts of Appeals, 26 AM. J.
POL. Sci. 225 (1982) (finding that a substantial number of unanimous court of appeals's
decisions are not consensual, but rather reflect ideological preferences of the court
majority).
76. See, e.g., Witcher v. City of Greenville, 95 F.App'x 187, 187 (7th Cir. 2004) (unpublished decision) ("Witcher's suit is frivolous."). The court's opinion indicates that this case
was easily resolved under existing Supreme Court precedent. Id. The oral argument suggests that the appellant overlooked the controlling case and that the appellee kept quiet
about this oversight for strategic reasons. Oral argument: Witcher, 95 F.App'x 187 (Apr. 9,
2004), available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?caseno=03-4092&submit=
showdkt&yr=03&num=4092.
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1. OperationalizingIdeology.-Definingjudges' ideological or policy preferences as a conceptual matter is fairly simple. They are the
policies personally favored by the judges, independent of their judgments about the policies required by external sources of positive law,
such as statutes or constitutions. Ideological preferences may be
based on judges' conceptions of justice or natural law, which they
might invoke to trump the positive law. Operationalizing judges' ideological preferences, however, is not at all simple. Scholars who study
elites in general all face a similar problem, one that is no less acute for
scholars ofjudicial behavior.7 7 Ideally, scholars could persuade judges
or other elites to participate in lengthy surveys about their policy preferences. Most scholars are not this persuasive.7 8 We are therefore
forced to struggle along with second-best measures. After considering
several measures,7 9 we conclude that the best available option is 8to0
rely primarily on Giles, Hettinger, and Pepper's (GHP) adaptation
of Keith Poole's "common space scores, '' s t which are measures of ideology tied to congressional votes.8 2
For each appellate judge, GHP assigned him or her one of two
common space scores. For judges nominated to sit in a state represented by a senator of the president's party, the senator's common
77. See, e.g., KLEIN, supra note 4, at 144 ("[My] measures of ideology might be improved .... although the fact that scholars have struggled with this problem for decades
does not inspire optimism."); SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 4, at 320 ("Measuring the attitudes of political elites is a difficult task, as senators, justices, and Presidents are unlikely to
fill out survey questionnaires provided by scholars, no less fill them out honestly.").
78. For a study that determined judicial preferences by survey, see Theodore L. Becker,
A Survey Study ofHawaiianJudges: The Effect on Decisions offudicial Role Variations,60 AM. POL.
ScI. REv. 677 (1966).
79. There are several alternatives. The first is coding policy preferences based on opinions. The second is relying on David Klein's ideology scores derived from profiles contained in the Almanac of the FederalJudiciary. KLEIN, supra note 4, at 63-64. The third is
relying on the political party ofjudges or the party of the appointing president as proxies
Landes et al., supranote 73, at 319; see also Kevin
for their ideological preferences. See, e.g.,
L. Lyles, PresidentialExpectations andJudicialPerformance Revisited: Law and Politics in the FederalDistrictCourts, 1960-1992, 26 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 447 (1996); Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to JudicialIdeology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 JusT. Svs. J. 219 (1999).
And the fourth is relying on newspaper editorials published prior to the Justices' confirmation to the Supreme Court. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 4, at 321;Jeffrey A. Segal
& Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme CourtJustices, 83 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 557, 560 (1989).
80. Giles et al., supra note 4. The GHP scores have been validated as a measure of
ideology. Virginia A. Hettinger et al., ComparingAttitudinal and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 AM. J. POL. Sci. 123, 131 (2004).
81. See Keith T. Poole, Recovering a Basic Space from a Set of Issue Scales, 42 AM. J. POL. SCL
954 (1998). Poole's common space scores are available at http://voteview.com/readmeb.
htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2006).
82. Poole, supra note 81, at 982.
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space score is used. The use of the senator's score rather than the
president's reflects the tradition of senatorial courtesy, whereby a senator of the president's party may veto potential judicial nominees to
his or her home state. 83 Scores for both senators and presidents are
on the same scale, ranging from most liberal at -1.0 to most conservative at +1.0. In situations where both senators from a state are members of the president's party, they assign the judge the average of the
two senators' scores. If neither of the two senators is of the same party
84
as the president, then they assign the judge the president's score.
Presidential scores are as follows: Johnson is rated at -.385; Ford at
.358; sCarter at -.510; Reagan at .568; Bush at .546; and Clinton at
-.456.

Using these scores for each appellate judge, GHP analyzed the
relationship between the judges' common space scores and their voting records in civil rights/liberties cases and criminal cases. They
found that the ideology of judges explains only a small percentage of
the variance in these cases, regardless of whether ideology is operationalized by the party of the appointing president or the common
space scores. As compared to six percent for measures based on party,
the common space scores explain nearly eleven percent of the variance. 86 This result is consistent either with the possibility that their
measure of preferences is inadequate or that the legal model is an
important element ofjudicial decisionmaking, one for which they did
not control.
Table 2 reports the scores for each judge of the Seventh Circuit
who has served in the past six years. Each of these judges continues to
serve on the court except for Judge Walter Cummings, who served
until his death in April 1999. Using this measure, Judge Cummings is
the most liberal judge to sit on the court in the past six years and
Judge Easterbrook is the most conservative.
2. Operationalizing Interpretive Philosophy.-Interpretive philosophy presents a greater challenge than our other variables. For ideology, collegiality, and trial court experience, the key question is
whether the operational definitions are valid, but these definitions
83. Donald R. Songer, The Policy Consequences of Senate Involvement in the Selection ofJudges
in the United States Courts of Appeals, 35 W. POL. Q. 107, 107 (1982).
84. Giles et al., supra note 80, at 4.
85. A potential problem, however, is that nominees with judicial experience may be
appointed because of their known legal preferences. For example, presidents and senators
might care a great deal about a judge's expressed legal preferences on labor laws without
caring much about any divergent policy preferences on the same issue.
86. Id. at 9.
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COMMON SPACE SCORES FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Judge

Score

Walter Cummings
Thomas F. Fairchild
Terence T. Evans
Diane P. Wood
Richard D. Cudahy
Ann Claire Williams
William J. Bauer
Joel M. Flaum
Richard A. Posner
Harlington Wood, Jr.
John L. Coffey
Michael S. Kanne
Daniel A. Manion
Kenneth F. Ripple
Ilana Diamond Rovner
Frank H. Easterbrook

-. 573
-. 464
-. 451
-. 416
-. 388
-. 345
-. 026
-. 026
-. 026
-. 026
.261
.369
.369
.369
.546
.568

(GHP)

should be very reliable. Interpretive philosophy, however, presents
challenges of validity and reliability. Our operational definition of interpretive philosophy is based on the coding of opinions written by
the judges, with the goal of quantifying how frequently they use certain interpretive tools in their opinion writing. We have attempted to
confirm the results of coding opinions by surveying former Seventh
Circuit law clerks on a variety of questions about the use of interpretive tools by their own judges and three other randomly selected Seventh Circuit judges.
a. Coding Opinions.-Interpretive philosophy is a difficult
concept to operationalize, but the most obvious starting point is to
rely on judges' written opinions. One might, for example, take a sample of all cases decided by a full opinion in a circuit and count the
number of opinions that demonstrate agreement or disagreement
with a certain definition of an interpretive philosophy, such as Sunstein's three-part definition of formalism.8 7 One might even make a
comparative judgment about the extent to which cases are decided
on, for example, formalist grounds by coding the opinions on a scale
running from strongly formalist to strongly nonformalist. Another option is to identify how often judges employ specific types of legal reasoning. It is this last option that we employ because certain
87. See supra Part I.B.
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interpretive tools are thought to define judicial philosophies such as
formalism. In addition, formalists and originalists do not always agree

among themselves. Justice Antonin Scalia, for example, likes dictionaries.8 8 Judge Easterbrook does not.89 Focusing on specific tools may
therefore provide a more sensitive measure of interpretive philosophy. We coded the cases for the following eight interpretive tools: the
original meaning of the Constitution, the canons of construction, legislative history, the plain meaning rule, dictionaries, economic analysis, use of balancing tests, and preference for rules.
We picked these tools both because the literature and numerous
professors we informally surveyed identified these tools as important.
Scholars have suggested that balancing tests, '0 dictionaries, 9 ' canons
of construction, 92 concerns for original meaning,9 3 and the plain

meaning rule 94 are all important elements of judicial decisionmaking.
In addition, many of these tools may characterize a number of interpretive philosophies. For example, a preference for rules, and the
plain meaning rule specifically, may embody Sunstein's definition of
formalism. While this list hardly exhausts the elements of the legal
model, we make an assumption that the use of tools directly measured
is correlated with the use of tools not directly measured-though as
noted in Part II, we currently lack an empirical understanding of how
the use of various tools fits together. Much like the standard measures
88. The rise of dictionary usage is frequently linked to Justice Scalia's textualism. See
WILLIAM N. ESKRmDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FPciKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (2d ed.

1995).
89. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 67 (1994) ("[T] he choice among meanings must have a footing more
solid that [sic] a dictionary-which is a museum of words, an historical catalog rather than
a means to decode the work of legislatures.").
90. See, e.g., Patrick M. McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REv. 585 (1988).
91. See, e.g., A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries,PlainMeaning, and Context in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71 (1994); Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L.

Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227 (1999); Samuel A. Thumma &Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon
Remains a Fortress: An Update, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 51 (2001); Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries
and Statutory Interpretation,107 HARv. L. REV. 1437 (1994).
92. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 10, at 26 ("All of this is so commonsensical that, were the
canons not couched in Latin, you would find it hard to believe anyone could criticize
them.").
93. See, e.g., Howard & Segal, supra note 5, at 124.
94. See, e.g., William T. Allen et al., Judge "the Game 6y the Rules": An Appreciation of the
JudicialPhilosophy and Method ofWalterK. Stapleton, 6 DEL. L. REV. 223, 262 (2003) ("[Judge]
Stapleton balks when he perceives his colleagues deviating from plain-meaning readings of
statutes in order to pursue what appears to him to be their own understanding of casespecific justice.").
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of ideology, our measure of judges' interpretive philosophies is ultimately a proxy measure of something much more complex.
Although we incorporated a longer list of sixteen tools into our
survey of judicial clerks, discussed below, we selected these eight because we were more confident in our ability to construct valid LEXIS
search terms for these tools. 9 5 Similar terms have been used in studies

by other researchers. Howard and Segal, for example, searched for
the terms "plain meaning" and "plain language" in U.S. Supreme
Court briefs to code textualist arguments. 6
We searched all opinions written by all sixteen judges while serving on the Seventh Circuit, including majority opinions, concurrences, dissents, and dubitanteopinions.9 7 We excluded, however, all
non-unanimous cases decided between August 1, 1997 and August 1,
2003, since these cases are the ones we seek to explain. This excluded
set of cases is not a random sample of Seventh Circuit decisions; it is
instead a block of six year's worth of non-unanimous cases. Excluding
them may bias our coding results, but including them could create
another problem: incorporating the same cases into both our independent and dependent variables would raise a concern about circularity. The concern would not be as serious as when judges' views are
95. The search terms were as follows: the original meaning of the Constitution (("original understanding" or "original intent" or "originalism" or "original meaning" or ratifie!) /
10 (constitution! or amendment or clause)) or (Federalist or "founding fathers" or "constitutional convention") or (framers /5 constitution! or amendment or clause)); canons of
construction ((canon! /5 statutory or construction or interpretation) or "expressio unius"
or "noscitur a sociis" or "ejusden generis" or "surplusage" or "in pari materia" or (derogation /2 "common law")); legislative history ("legislative history" or "committee report" or
"U.S.C.C.A.N." or "floor debate" or "committee statement" or "committee hearing" or "legislative counsel" or "H.R." or "S.J. Res." or "Cong. Rec." or "S. Res." or "H.R.J. Res." or "S.
Doc. No." or "S. Rep."); plain meaning rule ((plain or unambiguous or clear) /2 (meaning
or language)); dictionaries ("dictionaries" or "dictionary"); economic analysis ((cost! /3
benefit! /3 analysis) or "economic analysis" or ((economic or market!) /5 (efficien! or
inefficien!)); use of balancing tests (balancing /2 test!) or "balancing approach"; preference for rules (("bright line" or categorical or blanket or "per se") /5 (rule! or test!)). We
must note that an unusual and problematic LEXIS problem occurred many times when
doing this study. Sometimes the same search would show one or two fewer hits. We used
and coded the larger number of hits and ran searches multiple times to help ensure that
cases were not missed. This problem, now uncovered, should be of great concern to practitioners and social scientists. When searching all of ajudge's opinions for a certain phrase,
you can certainly not be sure that all the cases that actually use the search terms will be
generated by the search engine. Similarly, we note that the LEXIS date restriction frequently results in hits outside the selected time period.
96. Howard & Segal, supra note 5, at 123.
97. Some judges write dubitanteopinions in order to express doubt about the majority
opinion without dissenting. E.g., United States v. Zendeli, 180 F.3d 879, 887 (7th Cir.
1999) (Ripple, J., dubitante); see alsoJasonJ. Czarnezki, The Dubitante Opinion, 39 AKRON L.
REv. 1 (2006).
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coded as conservative or liberal based on case outcomes and then
these measures are used to predict case outcomes. We are not coding
the outcomes, but the arguments contained within the opinions.
Nevertheless, we decided to keep the sets of cases used to create the
independent and dependent variables distinct to avoid any issue of
circularity. Once we removed this set of non-unanimous cases from
the mix, we counted the number of cases in which each judge used
one of the eight interpretive tools. All cases that contained our search
terms were individually coded to determine whether the judge used
the relevant interpretive tool at least once in support of his or her
legal analysis.9 8 As opinions often contain references to multiple
tools, we coded many opinions multiple times. Across all tools, we
coded 6936 non-unique opinions.
To create a percentage of how often a judge employs a specific
interpretive tool, the number of opinions in which ajudge used a tool
was divided by the judge's total number of written opinions and then
multiplied by 100. Percentages for each interpretive tool can be
found in the tables in Part V and Appendix A. The interpretive tool
distance between two judges is equal to the absolute value of the difference in their percentages. For example, Judge John Coffey used a
dictionary in his legal analysis in 8.8% of the opinions he drafted,
while Judge Terence Evans employed dictionaries 4.4% of the time.
Thus, their dictionary usage distance is 4.4 percentage points.
We recognize that simple counts of references to dictionaries, invocations of the original meaning, and other references to these tools
may be misleading. Judges frequently reference an interpretive tool
even when it is not useful in deciding the case. In Country Mutual
Insurance Co. v. American Farm Bureau Federation, for example, Judge

Easterbrook refers to dictionaries as "word museums" and unhelpful
in determining the evolving meaning of language.9 9 Judge Posner has
lamented the "inadequacy of original understanding as a guide to

98. Six individuals, including four research assistants and the two authors, coded cases.
The four research assistants were each assigned a group of four judges and coded all eight
tools for each of these judges. The groups were as follows: (A) H. Wood, D. Wood,
Cudahy, Flaum; (B) Fairchild, Kanne, Ripple, Bauer; (C) Rovner, Manion, Coffey, Easterbrook; (D) Williams, Evans, Cummings, Posner. All cases that the research assistants found
difficult to code or marked with a question mark were coded by the authors. Opinions
written by each judge were coded according to a schedule based on the tools. During the
first week, all coders coded "Flaum-Dictionaries" as practice. The timeline then proceeded
as follows: dictionaries, balancing tests, legislative history, original meaning of constitution, canons of construction and preference for rules, plain meaning and economic analysis, and finally, inter-coder reliability testing.
99. 876 F.2d 599, 600 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Dictionaries are word museums.").
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constitutional interpretation "' ° and has questioned the usefulness of
the plain meaning rule.' 01 These sorts of references do not count as
uses for our purposes. Thus, merely counting references to the tools
is insufficient. More sophisticated coding rules are required, ones
that consider the context of each reference to an interpretative tool.
For our purposes, in order to count as a usage of a particular
interpretive tool, a judge must have used the interpretive tool in support of his or her legal analysis (e.g., interpreting or applying a contractual, statutory, or constitutional provision).'
Coding the cases
was time consuming and varied in difficulty. Many cases were easy to
code under our rules; others were quite difficult, depending upon the
nature of the reference. The level of difficulty also varied by tool.
Our coding rules recognize that judges may discuss tools, which
show up as search engine hits, without actually relying upon them to
decide a case. We believe that our coding system took this into account in a manner that our coders could consistently apply. The results of a check for inter-coder reliability, using Cohen's kappa, bear
out this success.'0 3 Dictionary usage was coded with great accuracy
with over ninety percent agreement between coders (K = .80).°4 Invo100. Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1096 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
concurring) ("And one can reply that such arguments merely demonstrate the inadequacy
of original understanding as a guide to constitutional interpretation; that they would if
accepted change the Constitution from a living document into a petrified reminder of the
limits of human foresight ....").
101. See, e.g.,
Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1482 (7th Cir. 1988) (PosnerJ.,
concurring) ("The idea that semantically unambiguous sentences-sentences clear 'on
their face'-sentences whose meaning is 'plain'-can be interpreted without reference to
purpose inferred from context is fallacious."); accord McElroy v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 73 F.3d
722, 726 (7th Cir. 1996).
102. The Coding Worksheet is available from and on file with the authors. The Coding
Memorandum can be found in Appendix E. Our coding procedures and rules can be
found in the Coding Worksheet and the Coding Memorandum. The basic coding rule was
that we coded a reference to the legal interpretive tool as a use in a judge's legal analysis
provided the reference was not clearly dicta and the reference was not a rejection of the
interpretive tool's value generally. The Coding Memorandum, supplied to all case coders,
explains and provides examples of how we dealt with a number of the most difficult
situations.
103. In order to perform the inter-coder reliability check, one judge was assigned to
each of the eight interpretive tools with two judges chosen from each original grouping.
Coders were assigned ajudge-tool match that they had not previously coded. We can think
of no reason why some judges are easier to code than others, making this nonrandom
distribution inappropriate. We also only chose tool-judge matches where the tool hits were
between thirty-five and seventy, so that each coder would have a near even amount of cases
to code. Despite this nonrandom distribution, the list includes both senior and recently
appointed judges. Cases were then coded as a use of the tool in the judge's legal analysis
or non-use.
104. The kappa coefficient indicates the percentage of the agreement rate between random agreement and perfect agreement. The kappa coefficient can be read on the follow-
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cations of the plain meaning rule (K = .72), economic analysis
(K = .65), bright line rules (K = .64), and legislative history (K = .68)
were coded with substantial success. Only canons of construction
were coded with only fair success (K = .31). Complete inter-coder reliability results can be found in Appendix B.
Regardless of the level of reliability, we have lingering concerns
about the validity of the coding for two tools, the plain meaning rule
and a preference for rules. The plain meaning rule holds that when a
text's language is plain, the court may not resort to other sources of
interpretation. We found coding this tool difficult because many
judges reference the "plain" or "unambiguous" text without clearly
following or rejecting the rule. Coding for a preference for rules was
also quite difficult. While we attempted to code only bright-line and
categorical rules, some rules are balancing tests themselves and some
rules are exceptions to bright-line rules. Despite these validity concerns, these terms were coded with substantial reliability.
We must admit that even sophisticated coding rules may be undermined if judges invoke an interpretive tool only when it happens
to support an outcome chosen for reasons unrelated to the tool. A
judge might, for example, conclude that a particular outcome is correct and then later look for some legislative history to support the
conclusion. This presents a more significant problem with relying on
opinions, one that even a sophisticated coding scheme cannot solve.
There are other reasons why opinions are problematic indicators
of the authors' interpretive views. First, judicial opinions on multimember courts are written in an environment that creates incentives
for strategic interaction. The controlling opinions of appellate courts
are majority opinions. They are the work of a coalition of at least two
judges, which means they may be the result of a compromise between
or among the judges in the majority. The incentive to compromise
may be even stronger than the need to craft a simple majority. Judges
are not necessarily indifferent to the size of the majority. Some judges
may very well prefer to avoid dissents except in cases of strong disagreement. A two-judge majority on an appellate panel may therefore
compromise with a third judge to avoid a dissent.1 0 5 The more the
ing scale: -1.00 - 0.00 (no agreement or poor agreement); 0.00 - 0.20 (slight agreement);
0.21 - 0.40 (fair agreement); 0.41 - 0.60 (moderate agreement); 0.61 - 0.80 (substantial
agreement); 0.81 - 1.0 (almost perfect agreement). J. Richard Landis & Gary G. Koch, The
Measurement of Observer Agreement for CategoricalData, 33 BIOMETRICS 159, 165 (1977).
105. See Sheldon Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in the United States Courts of Appeals,
1968 Wtis. L. REv. 461, 479-80 (discussing the "give-and-take" ofjudicial decisionmaking on
the courts of appeals); Cass R. Sunstein, Sober Lemmings, NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, Apr. 3,
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opinion represents a compromise, the more it may be unrevealing of
the true reasoning employed by any individual judge. We attempt to
limit this concern by measuring dissents and concurrences written by
judges. We could have included only these opinions, and not majority
opinions, because they are more likely to reflect true preferences, but
this would have greatly limited the number of cases where the specific
interpretive tools are invoked. However, we only code those opinions
written by the judges themselves, not all opinions in which they
joined.
Second, judges write majority and nonmajority opinions for multiple audiences. Oftentimes, they may try to persuade members of at
least some of these audiences. The primary audience for opinions
probably consists of lawyers who must advise their clients on how to
understand the law. Judges may therefore be more concerned about
informing lawyers than persuading them. But judges may still write
opinions to persuade various other groups, including reporters, scholars, or politicians. They may even occasionally write to persuade the
public-though the level of public interest in judicial opinions suggests this will often be unproductive.1 "6 Of course, another key audience is other judges.
At a minimum, judges want to persuade their colleagues on the
same court, but they may also want to persuade judges on other courts
as well. 1' 7 Judges on the courts of appeals, for example, may try to
persuade the Supreme Court that a particular decision is right or
wrong. Even so, the Supreme Court decides relatively few cases, so
the more common audience for majority and dissenting opinions may
be the judges on their own court, along with the district and appellate
judges in other circuits. Judges may even write opinions with future
judges in mind. If judges are in fact attempting to persuade other
judges, they will likely include arguments they think will persuade
other judges, whether or not these arguments are important to their
own thinking about a case. For example, suppose a judge thinks the
meaning of a statute is clear and is personally persuaded to decide the
2003, http://www.hws.edu/news/update/showwebclip.aspwebclipid=781 (describing the
conformism of federal judges).
106. See Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Media, Knowledge, and Public Evaluations
of the Supreme Court, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 352, 373 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995) (finding
that citizens are generally unaware of Supreme Court decisions); John H. Kessel, Public
Perceptions of the Supreme Court, 10 MIDWESTJ. POL. SCI. 167, 172-75 (1966) (revealing the
public's lack of understanding about what the Court does).
107. Even judges who do not feel obliged to follow the decisions in other circuits do at
least consider whether the other circuits offer persuasive grounds for their decisions. See
KLEIN, supra note 4, at 88-91 (reporting on interviews with judges).
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case on this basis. The author might nevertheless add other arguments, such as discussions of the legislative history, for the benefit of
judges who might not be persuaded by the plain meaning argument.
Despite these potential problems, our assumption that judges use
these tools at different rates was borne out by the coding results.
b. Surveying Clerks.-Surveying judicial clerks offers an alternative to coding opinions and several potential advantages.""8 Former
clerks should be in a good position to know the interpretive philosophies of the judges for whom they clerked. As much as anyone, they
are experts on the judges. Clerks can learn this information not just
from reading opinions, but also from informal discussions, drafting
opinions, and oral arguments. In addition to discussing opinion
drafts, oral arguments may be a particularly good opportunity to identify the interpretive issues that most concern a judge. Judges have a
limited amount of time during arguments to ask questions, which may
lead them to focus on what they consider the most important legal
and policy questions.
Surveying clerks, however, is not a perfect solution. Individuals
cannot be randomly assigned to clerk for each judge, nor do judges
make random hiring choices. The biases in the clerkship selection
process may bias our survey results as well. Clerks of each judge may
have systematically different conceptions of how to classify the judges
than clerks of other judges.
We sent out 114 surveys to former judicial clerks about multiple
judges, asking questions about each clerk's own judge plus three additional judges, randomly selected. Names of former clerks were taken
primarily from the Judicial Yellow Books (1997-2002). The survey included the following elements:
Interpretive Tools: extra-textual sources beyond the case
law or the regulatory, statutory, or constitutional language;
precedent in statutory cases; precedent in constitutional
cases; the original meaning of the Constitution; the original meaning of a statute; the canons of statutory construction; legislative history; the plain meaning rule;
dictionaries; the underlying purpose of a statute; economic analysis; history and tradition when interpreting the
Constitution; information on the consequences of a stat108. We can conceive of two other alternatives, surveying judges or practitioners. With
judges, the response rate might be low. Because panel decisions that included nonparticipatingjudges would have to be eliminated from the analysis, full or close to full participation by all of the judges would be needed. With practitioners, their assessment of the
judges would likely be based primarily on reading opinions, which we can already code.
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ute; applying procedural rules strictly; leaving the district
courts with discretion in future cases; philosophy towards
balancing tests.
Judicial Labels: formalist; pragmatist; originalist; textualist.
The clerks were asked to rate their judges' and three other judges'
preferences for the various interpretive tools on a seven-point scale.
They were also asked to rate the applicability of the general labels on
a similar scale.1" 9 Of the surveys sent, only thirteen were returned, a
response rate of 11.4%. What accounts for this less than stellar response rate? While targeting a sample of clerks raises an ethical concern, participation in the survey should not be problematic under the
general ethical guidelines for judicial employees.110 None of the survey questions involve specific cases. Instead, they include only widely
accepted alternatives to legal interpretation. Nevertheless, many
clerks declined to participate in our study."' One factor might be
some judges' negative views of empirical studies," 2 but unlike most
other studies of judicial decisionmaking, we incorporate measures of
traditional legal factors in our analysis, whereas many other studies
incorporate only measures of judges' ideology. The more important
factors were likely the busy schedules of the respondents and ethical
concerns about the survey.
The precise nature of an ethical or confidentiality concern is unclear. It is a well-known practice for attorneys at law firms to ask colleagues about judges for whom they clerked. Asking a colleague
109. A copy of the original survey is on file with authors.
110. Judicial clerks serving in the 2003 term or later were excluded from the data set,
pursuant to Canon 3D of the Code of Conduct forJudicialEmployees and the Ethics for Federal
JudicialLaw Clerks, as to ensure they will not disclose any observations about ajudge's decisionmaking process in a specific and pending case. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES (Jud. Conf. of the United States 1996), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
guide/vol2/ch2a.html; FED. JUD. CTR., MAINTAINING THE PUBLIC TRUST:

ETHICS FOR FED-

ERAL JUDICIAL LAW CLERKS (2002), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Ethics01.
pdf/$file/Ethics01 .pdf.
111. We did receive a few letters and e-mails where former clerks offered their disapproval of the survey, or at least their discomfort with it, and declined to participate.
112. Judge Harry Edwards wrote:
This Essay ... aims to debunk the myth that ideology is a principal determinant
in decision making on the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
My purpose in writing is to refute the heedless observations of academic scholars
who misconstrue and misunderstand the work of the judges of the D.C. Circuit. I
will show that, even when one looks carefully at the so-called 'empirical studies'
that purport to analyze the work of my Circuit, it is clear that, in most cases,
judicial decision making is a principled enterprise that is greatly facilitated by
collegiality among judges.
Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REv. 1335,
1335 (1998).
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general questions about ajudge's judicial philosophy is not thought to
raise any ethical problems, even though this information may be helpful to members of the firm practicing before a particular judge or
court. Indeed, clerks must acquire some knowledge about their
judges' general views on legal interpretation while clerking. If this
knowledge constituted confidential information, then it would be improper for former clerks to practice before the circuits in which they
clerked. The former clerk's knowledge would impact the allocation of
her or her firm's research efforts in litigation and the contents of filings before the court, therefore benefiting the former clerk and her
clients. But the rules for former clerks are not so strict.
3. OperationalizingTrial Court Experience.-Appellatejudges with
trial court experience may view the actions of lower court judges differently than appellate judges without such experience. Judges with
similar trial court experience may more readily agree with each other
about the types of decisions deserving of deference and the types of
decision that do not. Appellate judges consider the reputations of district courtjudges in reviewing their decisions,1 13 and several judges on
the Seventh Circuit previously served on a district court within the
circuit. Given their personal experience, they may view the reputations of district courtjudges differently from the other Seventh Circuit
judges. Additionally, recent research suggests that deference to inferior courts is an important element for modeling appellate
decisionmaking.l1 4
Trial court experience, for the purposes of this study, is defined
as any experience as a trial courtjudge at the state, municipal, or local
level. For each dyad of judges, we used dummy variables for whether
(0) neither judge has trial court experience, (1) one judge has trial
court experience, or (2) both judges have trial court experience. Of
113. For example, the court in FMC Corp. v. Glouster Engineering Co. observed:
And since appeals under 1292(b) are permitted only when they present controlling questions of law-as to which appellate review is plenary-the reputation of
the district judge for care and skill in resolving factual disputes and making the
many discretionary determinations confided to trial judges-a reputation better
known to the court of appeals for the transferee circuit than to the court of appeals for the transferor circuit-is not an important factor in deciding the appeal.
830 F.2d 770, 772 (7th Cir. 1987). See William Patry, The Patry Copyright Blog, How to
Learn from Dick Posner (May 5, 2005), http://www.williampatry/blogspot.com/2005/05/
how-to-learn-from-dick-posner.html (discussing Judge Posner's comment that the Seventh
Circuit "considers the reputation of the district court judge below in determining the
amount of deference to give").
114. E.g., Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L.
REv. 1459, 1499-1503 (2003).
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the judges included in the dataset, one-half served as trial courtjudges
at the federal or state level. Judges Fairchild, Cummings, Cudahy,
Posner, Easterbrook, Ripple, Manion, and Diane Wood lack trial court
experience, though Judges Fairchild and Cudahy (along with Judge
Coffey) served as justices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The other
eight judges, Bauer, Coffey, Flaum, Kanne, Rovner, Evans, Williams,
and Harlington Wood have trial court experience, either at the federal, state, or municipal level.1 1 5
4. OperationalizingJudicialCollegiality.-Judicialcollegiality likely
plays a substantial role on the courts of appeals. In all cases decided
in the 1997 through 2003 terms, no two judges agreed any less than
ninety percent of the time. Numerous sources speak of the importance of collegiality among chambers and judges.1 16 Judge Harry Edwards claims that judicial decisionmaking is a product of collegiality
and that deliberation among judges has a "moderating" effect on the
judges.' 17 This collegiality allows them to discuss cases in a way that
will allow judges to reach a "mutually acceptable judgment based on
their shared sense of the proper outcome." ' IfJudge Edwards is correct, perhaps judges who have spent more time together on a court
can more effectively determine how to recognize and write these "mutually acceptable judgments." Over time, members of the court essentially can learn how to agree with particular colleagues. We therefore
operationalize collegiality by adding a variable denoting the number
of terms the two judges in the dyad were on the court together at the
time the decision was made.
5. Operationalizing Case Type.-There is good reason to think
that some areas of the law are more malleable than others or more
ideologically divisive. In other words, the policy preferences ofjudges
are likely to be more influential in some cases than others. Thus, the
972 dyads in our dataset were coded for case type using the thirteen
different categories developed for Harold Spaeth's U.S. Supreme Court
Judicial Database."t9 Constitutional cases may be more revealing of
115. This information can be found in the Almanac of FederalJudiciary, supra note 73, at
1-45, and in the 2004 Judicial Yellow Book.
116. See, e.g.,
Chicago Council of Lawyers, Evaluation of the United States Court of Appealsfor
the Seventh Circuit,43 DEPAUL L. REv. 673, 687 (1994) (noting the importance and tradition
of collegiality on the Seventh Circuit).
117. Edwards, supra note 112, at 1358.
118. Id.
119. HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE ORIGINAL UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL
DATABASE 1953-2003 TERMS (2006), available at http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/allcourtscodebook.pdf. Spaeth's thirteen general categories include criminal proce-
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judges' preferences, particularly cases involving ideologically divisive
issues. At the Supreme Court level, the Justices' policy preferences
are strongly correlated with their votes in civil liberties and civil rights
cases. t2 ° The correlation is likely to be weaker at the appellate level
because the courts of appeal lack discretion over their docket and because the courts of appeal are subject to a higher court, 12 ' but these
types of cases may still be revealing of appellate judges' policy preferences, albeit imperfectly. In contrast, there may be some case types
where ideological preferences as typically defined are simply unclear.
The conservative view of, say, copyright or trademark law is not clear.
D. Method of Analysis
The basic method of analysis is to test whether our independent
variables predict which judges will agree with one another in our set
of non-unanimous cases. The unit of analysis is not a case, but a twojudge dyad. In each appellate case decided by a three-judge panel,
there are three opportunities for agreement or disagreement, since
there are three pairs of judges. By hypothesis, agreement between
each pair ofjudges is partially a function of their ideological disagreement, interpretive disagreement, trial court experience, collegiality,
and the case type. We analyzed the data using two logit models, one
dichotomous and one multinomial. We took into account that the
decisions of each judge on a multimember court are likely to be correlated. Judges have incentives to reach agreement and avoid dissents,
one being a desire to maintain collegiality and another to minimize
the labor involved in producing dissenting opinions. In other words,
each judge does not decide each case in a vacuum, independently of
the other two judges on the panel.
We now briefly describe how we analyzed these relationships.
The major issue is to determine what counts as "agreement." Should
agreement in the judgment of a case be the focus? If so, then judges
who agree in the outcome, regardless of any concurrences, would be
classified as agreeing. The level of agreement would therefore be dichotomous: judges either agree or disagree over the judgment. Each
dyad would be classified as being in agreement or disagreement,
dure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, attorneys, unions, economic
activity, judicial power, federalism, interstate relations, federal taxation, and miscellaneous.
Id. at 42.
120. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 4, at 322-23.
121. See, e.g., Causeway Med. Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1113 (5th Cir. 1997) (Garza,
J., concurring) ("For the second time in my judicial career, I am forced to follow a Supreme Court opinion I believe to be inimical to the Constitution.").
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coded as "0" or "1." Simply put, only dissents would count as
disagreement.
This dichotomous approach sacrifices information about the relationship between the two judges in a dyad. Maybe the partial agreements or disagreements reflected in concurring opinions should also
be considered. Concurrences are after all an important means for expressing disagreement with the legal reasoning in a case. A judge's
preference for a rule instead of a balancing test might be made clear
in a concurrence, despite the two judges' agreement on the outcome
of the case. Concurrences are therefore an opportunity for judges
with differing ideological or jurisprudential views to express their
preferences. Thus, we should also analyze the data in terms of multiple levels of agreement for each dyad, which we will call complete
agreement, partial agreement, second order partial agreement, third
order partial agreement, and disagreement.
The five levels of agreement in the multinomial model are defined and coded as follows: Complete agreement occurs when two
judges in a dyad sign the same opinion without any separate opinions,
regardless of who wrote the opinion. Agreement in this situation is
coded as a "0." Partial agreement between two judges in a dyad is
defined as one judge concurring with the otherjudge's opinion and is
coded as a "1." Second order partial agreement is defined as one
judge concurring in part and dissenting in part with the second judge
in the dyad and is coded as a "2." Third order partial agreement is
defined as one judge concurring only in the judgment of the other
judge's opinion and is coded as a "3." Disagreement is defined as one
judge dissenting from the opinion of the otherjudge in the dyad. It is
coded as a "4."
We think there are merits to analyzing the cases in both dichotomous terms and in terms of multiple levels of agreement. Whether to
agree in the judgment is often the most important decision. On the
other hand, we do not want to ignore the value of concurring opinions for making clear large and small disagreements between judges,
some of which may be attributable either to interpretive rather than
ideological disagreements.
We can now describe the analysis in more concrete terms. The
dependent variable is agreement, whether measured with a dichotomous variable or a multinomial variable. For the dichotomous version
of the dependent variable, we use a traditional logit model. For the
multinomial version, we use a multinominal logit model. In each
model, the independent variables are the same. The first is the absolute value of the ideological distance between the two judges in the
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dyad. As noted earlier, we will use GHP's measure. The second is the
absolute value of the interpretive distances between the two judges in
the dyad. The third is the measure of collegiality. We also include a
series of dummy variables representing different categories of cases
and whether or not one or both judges in the dyad have trial court
experience.
A typical Seventh Circuit non-unanimous case is one that includes two opinions (though three are possible), one opinion for the
majority and one for the dissenter. Thus, the one dyadic relationship
on the panel in complete agreement is coded as a "0." The other two
dyads are both coded as a "4." In the dichotomous coding system,
these two dyads would be coded as a "1." A very small number of cases
present greater difficulty. Non-unanimous cases occasionally include
three opinions, for which the dichotomous system of coding agreement is ill-suited.
Take United States v. Amerson,' 22 a case involving several questions
of criminal procedure. The Amerson panel included Judges Coffey,
Evans, and Posner. Coffey wrote the majority opinion, Evans concurred with Coffey's opinion, and Posner dissented. For the dichotomous measure of agreement, Coffey and Evans would be coded as
agreeing ("0"), Coffey and Posner would be coded as disagreeing
("1"), and Evans and Posner would be coded as disagreeing ("1"). But
this dichotomous approach ignores the difference between Coffey
and Evans, which is represented by Evans's concurrence. Using the
multinomial approach, Coffey and Evans's relationship is one of partial agreement ("1"). Coffey and Posner are in full disagreement
("4"). What about Evans and Posner? This is the hard question. One
might think Evans and Posner are closer to one another than Coffey
and Posner, since Evans did not fully agree with Coffey's majority
opinion. However, concurring judges are not necessarily closer in
their views to the dissenting judge. Posner might very well have
agreed with Coffey over Evans had he been required to side with one
or the other.
Generally, it would be very difficult to figure out whether a dissenter is closer to the majority or concurring opinion, absent an express statement in the dissent, something along the lines of the judge
saying, "If I was to come out the other way, I would adopt the standard
of the concurrence rather than the majority opinion." In many cases,
it may be nearly impossible to make this determination, even with a
very close reading of the opinions-an approach not even feasible
122. 185 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 1999).
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with a large number of cases. Our intuition is to code Evans and Posner as being in disagreement ("4"), since they disagreed on the outcome of the case and there is no way to determine if Posner was any
closer to Evans than Coffey. Figure 1 illustrates the relationships. Using GHP's scores, we have also calculated the policy distances for each
dyad in this case. The ideological distance between Coffey and Posner, for example, is .287, the closest of the three dyads. As an example, the interpretive distance for dictionary usage between Posner and
Coffey is 4.2%. Both Coffey and Evans have trial court experience.
Lastly, Evans served with Posner and Coffey for three years at the time
of the decision, while Posner and Coffey served together for sixteen.
FIGURE 1:

DYADIC RELATIONSHIPS FOR THE AMERSON PANEL
Dependent Variable
=
Agreement 4
Independent Variables
Ideology = 1.261 - (-.026)1 = .287
Interpretive Philosophy (Dictionary)
Trial Court Experience = 0
Collegiality = 16

Coffey
Majority

Dependent Variable
Agreement = 1
Independent Variables
Ideology
=.261-(-.451)[=.712
Interpretive Philosophy (Dictionary) = 2.8
Trial Court Experience = 1
Collegiality = 3

IV.

A.

4.2

Posner
Dissenting

Dependent Variable
Agreement= I
Independent Variables
Ideology
= 1.451 - (-.026)1 =.477
Interpretive Philosophy (Dictionary)
Trial Court Experience = 0
Collegiality = 3

Evans
Concurring

-

-

1.4

FINDINGS

DescriptiveFindings

1. Basic Rates of Agreement in the Seventh Circuit.-Judges in the
courts of appeals agree in an overwhelming number of cases. In fact,
the vast majority of three-judge panels are unanimous. However, this
is not to say there is no disagreement among individual judges. In the
Seventh Circuit, while some judicial pairs never disagreed over a sixyear period, some pairs disagreed nearly ten percent of the time. Table 3 summarizes the rates of disagreement on the Seventh Circuit for
the period August 1, 1997 to July 31, 2003.
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2. InterpretivePhilosophy: The Use of Interpretive Tools.-As stated in
Part III, we coded the use of the eight interpretive tools in all the
opinions written by each judge prior to December 31, 2004, excluding
those non-unanimous cases used for the dependent variable. Table 4
contains the number of each judges' opinions we coded. Again, we
coded some cases multiple times because they contained multiple
search terms. The results of the coding effort suggest there is value to
a complex coding scheme as opposed to simply counting the number
of references found through a computer database search. The results
also suggest that coding opinions is superior to surveying clerks,
though the low response rate to the survey makes this conclusion very
tentative.
TABLE

4:

TOTAL NUMBER Or OPINIONS WRITTEN AS OF
DECEMBER

Judge
Bauer
Coffey
Cudahy
Cummings
Easterbrook
Evans
Fairchild
Flaum

12, 2004

Opinions

Judge

Opinions

1353
1186
1368
1279
1418
429
622
1370

Kanne
Manion
Posner
Ripple
Rovner
D. Wood
H. Wood, Jr.
Williams

955
762
2029
1261
586
451
981
195

There was clearly an advantage to basing usage scores on coded
opinions rather than raw LEXIS hits of our search terms. Judges do
cite certain tools in an unfavorable manner or when they have no impact on their legal analysis, e.g., dicta. For example, Judge Ann Williams references dictionaries in 5.1% of her opinions, but uses them
positively in a legal analysis in only 1.5% of her opinions. Table 5
below provides the dictionary usage information for all sixteen judges,
including the results of the survey. The "unfiltered" results are based
on the raw hits for our search terms in LEXIS. The "filtered" results
are based on our coding of these LEXIS hits. For dictionary usage,
both the unfiltered results and the filtered results partially maintain
their ordering. Both before and after coding the opinions, Judge Coffey used dictionaries the most and Judge Posner the least. Other
judges change their positions in the rankings, butJudges Williams and
Harlington Wood moved quite a bit.
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TABLE

5:

DICTIONARY USAGE RANKINGS

Survey

Filtered

Unfiltered
Coffey
Manion
Cudahy
Rovner
Williams
Ripple
Kanne
Evans
Wood, D.
Wood, H.
Bauer
Fairchild
Flaum
Cummings
Easterbrook
Posner

(8.8%)
(6.6%)
(5.6%)
(5.2%)
(5.1%)
(4.7%)
(4.6%)
(4.4%)
(4.2%)
(4.2%)
(3.4%)
(3.1%)
(2.9%)
(2.9%)
(2.7%)
(2.3%)
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Coffey
Manion
Rovner
Kanne
Cudahy
Wood, H.
Ripple
Bauer
Evans
Williams
Fairchild
Flaum
Cummings
Wood, D.
Easterbrook
Posner

(4.4%)
(4.1%)
(2.9%)
(2.8%)
(2.4%)
(2.0%)
(1.9%)
(1.8%)
(1.6%)
(1.5%)
(1.4%)
(1.4%)
(1.2%)
(1.1%)
(0.6%)
(0.2%)

Kanne
Flaum
Wood, D.
Wood, H.
Evans
Easterbrook
Manion
Ripple
Bauer
Rovner
Cudahy
Coffey
Williams
Posner

(4.0)
(3.7)
(3.7)
(3.5)
(3.5)
(3.1)
(3.0)
(3.0)
(2.7)
(2.5)
(2.3)
(2.0)
(1.8)
(1.8)

NOTE: Unfiltered results are based on raw hits for LEXIS search terms. Each opinion
is counted only once regardless of the number of references to a dictionary. Filtered
results are based on our coding of these LEXIS hits. Survey results are based on the
responses of Seventh Circuit clerks.

Our coding results cast doubt on the validity of the survey data.
Judge Easterbrook is one of the most well-known judges on the appellate bench, and in his opinions, he has publicly described his distrust
of dictionaries as interpretive tools. The coding data confirm his
statements, showing that Judge Easterbrook ranks near the bottom in
dictionary usage-even when one relies on the unfiltered results. Yet
the survey data suggest Judge Easterbrook views dictionaries more favorably than eight other judges (though Judges Daniel Manion and
Kenneth Ripple are probably indistinguishable from Judge Easterbrook, given the difference of only .10). The survey results for Judge
Easterbrook's use of legislative history better match his public statements, since the clerks rank him at the bottom. 1 23 But the coding
results, which indicate he uses legislative history in 6.1% of his opinions, are not obviously wrong. Judge Easterbrook does in fact use leg124
islative history in his opinions.
The survey results are also quite misleading for Judge Coffey. He
is the most frequent user of dictionaries, the most reliably coded tool,
123. See Easterbrook, supra note 89, at 62 ("Am I not a notorious opponent of legislative
history? That is indeed my position . .

").

124. See, e.g., Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351,
1361 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The legislative history reinforces the implication of the text.").
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but the survey results rank him near the bottom. Clerks are presumably experts on the judges, but the results suggest that clerks may not
be able to answer detailed questions about particular interpretive
tools with a high degree of accuracy. We cannot conclude, however,
that the coding results are without problems. Although Judge Coffey
ranks as the judge most committed to originalism, which is quite plausible, 12 5 Judge Posner ranks as the second most committed to originalism, which is less plausible.12 6 Nevertheless, the coding results appear
more accurate than the survey results. The interpretive tool usage
rankings for the other seven tools can be found in Appendix A.
B. Regression Analysis
As explained above, in testing what factors influence judicial decisionmaking, the unit of analysis is agreement between a dyad of two
judges. Before conducting the regression analysis, we consider
whether to include the results for all of the interpretive tools in the
analysis. One question is whether any tools are so highly correlated so
as to be indistinguishable.' 2 7 As can be seen from the results, we can
make some meaningful decisions about which variables to use in the
analysis.
First, as one would predict, dictionaries and the plain meaning
rule are strongly correlated (.810), and the correlation is statistically
significant (p = .000). Given this relationship and our doubts about
coding plain meaning, we chose to keep dictionaries in our analysis
and drop plain meaning. Despite our decision to exclude plain mean-

ing, the relationship between the two tools reinforces the validity of
our coding scheme.
Second, original meaning is moderately correlated with the GHP
ideology score (.541), and the correlation is significant (.030). The
direction of the relationship is what one would expect. The more
conservative a judge, the more likely he or she is to be an originalist.
Due to the low coding reliability for original meaning and its correlation with ideology, it is not included in our analysis.
Third, from a purely theoretical standpoint, a preference for
standards, i.e., balancing tests, and a preference for rules are opposites, so both should not be retained in the final analysis. Given this
theoretical concern and the difficulty in coding a preference for rules,
125. Judge Coffey has recently described himself in originalist terms. Marquette Lawyers
on the Seventh Circuit, MARQ. LAW., Spring 2005, at 4, 6. In the same article, Judge Evans
described himself as a pragmatist. Id at 7.
126. See POSNER, supra note 48, at 237-55 (criticizing originalism).
127. The correlation matrix can be found in Appendix D.
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we dropped rules from our analysis. In sum, we kept the following
four variables in the regression as independent variables: (1) balancing, (2) dictionaries, (3) economic analysis, and (4) legislative history. 128 Again, this list is a subset of all interpretive tools, one that may

or may not be a good proxy for a larger package of interpretive
beliefs.
TABLE 6:

Category
0
1
2
3
4
Total

CATEGORY FREQUENCY IN MULTINOMIAL REGRESSION

Frequency

Percent

314
212
99
47
300
972

32.3
21.8
10.2
4.8
30.9
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
32.3
54.1
64.3
69.1
100.0

We generated binomial and multinomial logistic regressions,
clustering by case citation because the observations for each panel are
correlated. In the binomial logistic regression, agreement is coded as
0 (related by signing the same opinion or an opinion concurring, concurring in the judgment, or concurring in part and dissenting in part)
or 1 (related by a dissent). At the outset, the results of the binomial
model are potentially less revealing than those of the multinomial
model. By considering anything but dissents as agreement, the binomial analysis ignores other forms of genuine disagreement. Table 6
shows that concurrences (category 1) in the multinomial model comprise a significant amount of the data (212 of 972 dyads). The multinomial results indicate that concurrences are an important form of
moderate disagreement.
Although the variables for ideology and interpretive philosophy
are not statistically significant in this model, collegiality and one of the
dummy variables representing trial court experience (Trial court 2)
did have a significant impact on agreement. As shown in Table 7,
each additional year on the bench together for a pair of judges decreased the odds of disagreement by 3.6%, controlling for other variables in the model. Similarly, when both judges had trial court
experience, the odds of disagreement declined by 47.9%. Some predicted probabilities can better illustrate the meaning of these odds
128. Canons were deleted due to inter-coder reliability concerns. See supra Part III.C.2.a.
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values. Assume that the variables for collegiality, ideological distance,
and interpretive philosophy are held at their means. In criminal procedure cases, which represent the largest category of case types in the
dataset (n=303), the probability of disagreement is 39.2% (plus or minus 9.2%) for a pair of judges with no trial court experience between
them. The probability of disagreement declines to 34.6% (plus or minus 7.3%) when one judge has trial court experience. It declines even
further to 25.1% (plus or minus 8.4%) when both judges have trial
court experience.' 29 These particular probabilities must be interpreted with caution. Despite the statistical significance of the variable
Trial court 2, the 95% confidence intervals for these predicted
probabilities obviously overlap. Also, it must be noted that this model
does not produce better predictions overall than simply predicting
the modal outcome, i.e., agreement, for all observations. More complete results can be found in Appendix C.
TABLE

7:

BINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION ON DICHOTOMOUS
AGREEMENT VARIABLE

Variable

Odds
Ratio

Std.
Err.

Z

P> z

Collegiality

0.964

0.016

-2.230

0.026

0.933

0.996

Dist. - ideology

1.000

0.003

-0.100

0.920

0.995

1.005

Trial court 1
Trial court 2
Dist. - balancing
Dist. - dictionaries
Dist. - economic analysis
Dist. - legislative history

0.823
0.521
0.743
1.026
0.877
0.970

0.144
0.136
0.134
0.078
0.096
0.032

-1.110
-2.500
-1.650
0.340
-1.200
-0.920

0.267
0.012
0.098
0.732
0.230
0.359

0.584
0.313
0.522
0.884
0.709
0.909

1.161
0.868
1.056
1.191
1.086
1.035

95% Conf.
Interval

NOTE: Controls for case type included. Standard errors adjusted for clustering by case citation.

The multinomial model provides more interesting results than
the binomial model because distinct categories of agreement or disagreement are not collapsed together. As with the binomial model,
complete results for the multinomial model can be found in Appendix C. Table 8 provides partial results, comparing the odds of dissenting versus signing the same opinion, which is to say, full disagreement
as compared to full agreement. At the outside, it is worth noting that
this model, unlike the binomial model, does better predict the outcomes than simply guessing the modal categories.

129. These confidence intervals are based on the delta method. SeeJ. ScoTt LONG &
JEREMY FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT VARIABLES USING STATA

127 (2d ed. 2006).
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Collegiality had a strong relationship to judicial agreement. As
years of joint service increased, the odds of disagreement decreased.
This result was strongest for the two largest categories of the dataset,
concurrences and dissents. As compared to joining the same opinion,
for each additional year of joint service, the odds of disagreement decreased 5.0% for a concurrence (category 1) to 5.8% for a dissent
(category 4). (See Appendix C for category 1 results.)
TABLE

8:

MULTINOMIAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR
FULL DISAGREEMENT

Dissentyvs. Full
agreement

Odds
Ratio

Robust
Std. Err.

Z

P> Iz [

Collegiality
Dist. - ideology
Trial court 1
Trial court 2
Dist. - balancing
Dist. - dictionaries
Dist. - economic analysis

0.942
1.003
0.600
0.291
0.790
0.995
0.832

0.016
0.003
0.119
0.077
0.159
0.081
0.106

-3.540
0.860
-2.580
-4.650
-1.170
-0.070
-1.440

0.000
0.387
0.010
0.000
0.241
0.948
0.151

0.912
0.997
0.407
0.173
0.533
0.847
0.648

0.974
1.009
0.885
0.490
1.171
1.168
1.069

Dist. - legislative history

0.933

0.038

-1.690

0.092

0.861

1.011

NOTE:

95% Conf.
Interval

Controls for case type included. Standard errors adjusted for clustering by case citation.

Like collegiality, trial court experience was statistically significant
in multiple categories. Having one judge (Trial court 1) or both
judges (Trial court 2) with trial court experience decreased the odds
of disagreement in all categories, though the result was not statistically
significant for concurring in the judgment (category 2). Where one
judge had trial court experience, for example, the odds of dissenting
declined by 40.0%. Where both judges had trial court experience, the
odds of dissenting declined by 70.9%. Once again, these results can
be better illustrated with some predicted probabilities. Focusing on
criminal procedure cases as before and holding other variables at
their mean values, Table 9 shows the predicted probabilities for each
level of agreement as the extent of trial court experience is adjusted.
As the table indicates, the probability of full agreement increases as
judges with trial court experience are added to a dyad. When no
judges with trial court experience are in the dyad, the probability of
full agreement is 22.0% Adding one judge with trial court experience
results in a probability of full agreement of 32.3%. Adding a second
judge with trial court experience raises this probability to 46.6%. At
the same time, the probabilities of full disagreement (or dissent) decrease as judges with trial court experience are added to a dyad, going
from 39.9% to 35.0% and then to 24.5% (though with overlapping
confidence intervals).
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TABLE 9: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FOR TRIAL COURT
EXPERIENCE
Agreement
Type

TCE=0

0
1
2
3
4

22.0%
24.5%
8.6%
5.0%
39.9%

95% C.I.
(18.0%
(15.7%
(3.7%
(0.4%
(30.3%

26.1%)
33.2%)
13.6%)
9.6%)
49.5%)

TCE=1
32.2%
19.8%
11.0%
2.1%
35.0%

(TCE)
95% C.I.
(28.4%
(13.3%
(5.9%
(-0.2%
(27.7%

35.9%)
26.3%)
16.0%)
4.4%)
42.3%)

TCE=2
46.6%
14.0%
12.7%
2.2%
24.5%

95% C.I.
(39.2%
(7.5%
(4.0%
(0.3%
(16.4%

53.9%)
20.5%)
21.4%)
4.7%)
32.7%)

NOTE: Probabilities are for Case Type 1, criminal procedure. Other variables are set at their
mean values.

The results for ideology and interpretive philosophy were not significant. In one category, concurring in the judgment, ideology was
almost significant (p = .051) and was in the expected direction, but
the effect was quite small (OR = 1.009). Similarly, the preference for
certain interpretive tools had no statistically significant effect on
agreement. In addition, no case types showed significant effects on
agreement, except for judicial power cases (case type 9).130 Even for
these cases, however, the effect was significant only for concurrences
in the judgment (OR = .127, p = 0.049), the least frequent category in
Table 6.
V.

EVALUATION OF FINDINGS

The central task of this study was to operationalize judges' interpretive philosophies and to determine whether various approaches to
legal interpretation help to explain decisions on the court of appeals.
As seen in Table 3, judges agree with one another the vast majority of
the time. The room for interpretive philosophy to play an important
role appears to be confined to a relatively small minority of opinions,
but the data suggest that differing approaches to legal interpretation,
at least as we have measured them, have little effect even in the minority of cases where one might predict interpretive philosophy to be
most important.
We do not claim that law does not matter; the Seventh Circuit,
like every other court, frequently cites precedent and likely prefers to
follow it. But even if law matters, academic conceptions of legal interpretation, with its great attention on the legitimate use of particular
interpretive approaches, may be wide of the mark. Judges, unlike in130. We excluded several case type dummy variables because few dyads (and even fewer
cases) fell into these categories. Although forty-eight dyads (based on sixteen cases) fell
into case type 3, we excluded this dummy variable because it caused anomalous results in
the regression.
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terpretive theorists, may lack strong commitments to particular modes
of interpretation, instead being more pragmatic in their approaches.
Varying rates of usage for the interpretive tools may be more a function of how individual judges think decisions should be explained
rather than how they actually reach these decisions. Pragmatic judges
are not lawless, but they may not be committed enough to the various
theories of interpretation to allow us to measure the role of formalism
or originalism (to think broadly)-or the use of dictionaries (to think
narrowly). Even so, legislative history did have a statistically significant
impact, but it is difficult to explain this result. Unless the use of legislative history is serving as a proxy for a larger package of interpretive
approaches, it is difficult to understand why views on legislative history
alone would affect judicial outcomes, especially when the effect is in
the opposite direction that theory predicts.
The data suggest that ideological differences do not affect judicial disagreement. Either most cases do not implicate ideology as typically understood or the standard proxy measures for ideology are
simply too rough to be serviceable, at least in a data set that is not
confined to the most ideologically divisive issues. While many scholars
have lamented the importance of ideology, 131 "to suggest that partisan
or ideological preferences are prevalent influences in deciding most
cases .. .is a dubious extrapolation from the empirical evidence."1 3 2

The courts of appeals, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, do not have a
discretionary docket containing only highly controversial cases. This
is not to say that the courts of appeals do not hear some ideologically
charged issues, but these cases are a small minority of the docket.
Hence, when looking at judicial decisionmaking in general on the
lower courts, it is not surprising that the role of ideology would be
limited.' 3 3
The data do suggest that judicial decisionmaking is influenced by
judicial relationships and experience. We defined "collegiality" as the
number of terms a pair of judges served on the court together at the
time a decision was made. (The term might be better described as
"co-tenure.") Judges were less likely to disagree with one another the
131. E.g., Sunstein et al., supra note 26, at 331-34. But see Sisk & Heise, supra note 7, at
758 (arguing that their "finding of ideological voting is rather contained").
132. Sisk & Heise, supra note 7, at 746. In their study of religious cases, the "ideology of
judges faded into the background." Id. at 766; see also Gregory C. Sisk et al., Searchingfor the
Soul ofJudicial Decisionmaking:An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIo ST.
L.J. 491 (2004).
133. Admittedly, while we do include collegiality and trial court experience, our included background variables are limited to these two. Further research may include more
variables. Cf Sisk'& Heise, supra note 7, at 773-74.
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longer they served together. There may be a number of reasons for
this finding. First, as Judge Edwards has stated, judicial collegiality
lends itself to agreeing. Second, after many years on the bench together, judges will better understand how to reach compromises with
their colleagues. Third, perhaps judges goals may change. Judges are
concerned with the quality of their work environment, a concern that
may grow over time. Lastly, implicit vote trading may occur. If Judge
A, despite some concerns, signed on to Judge B's opinion, then Judge
B might sign on to Judge A's opinion more readily in the future. Indeed, the norm of collegiality may both suppress or amplify ideological disagreements. 134 At least in some types of cases, three
Republicans or three Democrats are more likely to vote their predicted ideological preferences than mixed panels. Where the panel is
mixed, collegial judges moderate their views. Our methodology does
not pick up this sort of ideological voting, but it does offer support for
the importance of collegiality.
Trial court experience also strongly affected agreement, especially when both judges served as trial courtjudges in the past. Judges
with similar judicial resumes may be more likely to agree with one
another because their similar experiences color how they view certain
cases. Many Seventh Circuit judges are former U.S. District Court
judges for the Northern District of Illinois, potentially providing very
similar background experiences for several judges. However, if one
judge was a former trial judge, they are also more likely to agree. One
wonders whether former trial judges are considered "experts" on
some lower court issues and, thus, are given substantial deference by
their colleagues.
VI.

FURTHER ANALYSIS AND POSSIBLE FUTURE RESEARCH

Our findings suggest that judges are not particularly committed
to any particular interpretive approach. However, judges still "talk" in
different ways, both in judicial decisions and publicly. In other words,
judges clearly state preferences for different interpretive approaches
and tools, and they express these preferences at different rates. Do
judges want to be perceived as part of a certain interpretive camp? Do
background characteristics impact howjudges "talk"? These questions
remain unresolved. Considering the opinions of the judiciary regarding collegiality, further study of this factor seems especially appropriate. For example, does the rate of agreement among judges increase
over time, even when they have divergent ideological views? Is there a
134. Sunstein et al., supra note 26, at 304-05.

2006] AN

EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION

relationship
agreement?

5

between

presidential

appointment

cohort

885
and

Despite our findings, more research on the role of interpretive
philosophies is needed. If judges' interpretive approaches can be
identified and cataloged, researchers can then move to the next question: determining the costs and benefits of various interpretive approaches. Obviously, evaluating costs and benefits raise some difficult
definitional questions. "Errors" in terms of Supreme Court or legislative reversals is one cost. Legislative reversals raise complicated questions,"' but we would like to know the frequency of formalist and
nonformalist courts, judges, and opinions being "overruled" by Congress or state legislatures, a question similar to William Eskridge's research on congressional overrides of the Supreme Court. 3 7
Overrides are costly, however, and literature suggests Congress does
not frequently overturn even the Supreme Court,13 8 despite the frequent introduction of legislation to do so. 1 39 Congressional attempts

to override the Supreme Court are more successful, however, as the
level of amicus curiae participation increases. 4 ° Thus, we should also
be interested in the role of interest groups in any discussion of congressional reversals as signals of appellate error.
As a final example, we might want to determine how often judges
of the courts of appeals "invite" legislatures to overrule their decisions.
If formalist judges are able to successfully "invite" legislative correction, then formalists may be able to achieve both their policy and legal
135. In other words, is the significance of our collegiality variable not a result ofjudges
learning to get along, but instead a result ofjudges appointed by the same president, e.g.,
Reagan, having served a long time together and, more importantly, having similar outlooks
on the law in ways not picked up by our other variables?
136. For a short discussion of political science literature on the institutional interactions
between Congress and the courts, see Jamie L. Carson & Kirk A. Randazzo, LSS Newsletter
Extension of Remarks, Emerging Multi-Institutional Analyses: Congress and the Courts,
http://www.apsanet.org/-Iss/newsletter/janO2/carson.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2006).
137. Eskridge, supra note 21.
138. E.g., Beth Henschen, Statutory Interpretationsof the Supreme Court: CongressionalResponse, 11 AM. POL. Q. 441, 454 (1983).
139. Andrew D. Martin, CongressionalDecision Making and the Separation of Powers, 95 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 361 (2001); Richard A. Paschal, The Continuing Colloquy: Congress and the
Finality of the Supreme Court, 8J.L. & POL. 143, 175-78 (1991).
140. Joseph Ignagni &James Meernik, Explaining CongressionalAttempts to Reverse Supreme
Court Decisions,47 POL. Rs. Q. 353, 365-66 (1994) (concluding that interest group pressure
based on the filing of amicus curiae briefs makes Congress more likely to respond to judicial decisions); James Meernik & Joseph Ignagni, CongressionalAttacks on Supreme Court Rulings Involving UnconstitutionalState Laws, 48 POL. REs. Q. 43, 56-57 (1995) (concluding that
the congressional response to Supreme Court decisions declaring state laws unconstitutional is impacted by the nature of the issue, the electoral concerns of members of Congress, and the degree of the impact of the Court's decision on the federal government).
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preferences.' 4 ' Nonformalists (and especially pragmatists) may have
no need to "invite" legislative action as they are less constrained in
reaching a preferred result. But to what extent do legislatures act on
these invitations by formalist judges? If legislatures frequently respond to the invitations of formalist judges-indicating that judges
are good at identifying legislative preferences-then we might prefer
that nonformalist judges save the legislature the costs of fixing easily
identifiable problems.
CONCLUSION

Research on the role of interpretive philosophies is important because scholars continue to debate the role of certain interpretive approaches in the decisionmaking process. Scholars also make
42
empirical claims about the impact of these interpretive approaches.
Our research suggests that interpretive approaches can, with difficulty, be empirically measured at some level, but we find little to no
evidence that interpretive philosophy, as typically conceived, actually
matters across cases generally. The conclusion is not that judicial lawlessness abounds. We have, for example, said next to nothing about
the role of precedent, which we assume matters a great deal in the
actual business of judging.
In his recent confirmation hearings, Chief Justice John Roberts,
in response to a question about his approach to constitutional interpretation, offered this view:
I don't have an overarching view. As a matter of fact, I don't
think very many judges do. I think a lot of academics do.
But the demands of deciding cases and the demands of deciding cases by committee-either a group of three or a
group of nine-I find with those demands the nuances of
academic theory are dispensed with fairly quickly and judges

141. See, e.g., Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Inviting CongressionalAction: A Study of
Supreme Court Motivations in Statutory Interpretation,43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 162 (1999); Pablo T.
Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Invitations to Override: CongressionalReversals of Supreme Court
Decisions, 16 INT'L REV. LAW & ECON. 503 (1996); see also C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP,
POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1996) (seeking to harmonize the
internal judicial claims of commitment to the rule of law with the results of political science research using patterns of attitudinal decisionmaking).
142. Howard & Segal, supra note 5, at 132 ("The role of text and intent in judicial decisions is very important. . . . [N]ormative scholars continue vigorously to debate the
topic ....
[S]cholars continue to make empirical claims that some Justices, at least, do in
fact respond positively to textual and intentional arguments.").
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to
take a more practical and pragmatic approach to trying
143
reach the best decision consistent with the rule of law.
On issues of interpretation generally, our findings are consistent with
this view, with understanding the courts of appeals as pragmatic bodies of fairly like-minded individuals (on most issues), not ongoing battles between true-blue formalists and non-formalists or devout
originalists and non-originalists. While further empirical testing is
certainly warranted, along with alternative approaches to measuring
judges' interpretive philosophies, our findings suggest that at least
some academic discussions of legal interpretation poorly reflect the
actual business of judging.

143. Nomination ofJudgeJohn G. Roberts, Jr. to Be ChiefJusticeof the Supreme Court: Hearing
Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (Federal News Service 2005); see also POSNER,
supra note 40, at 355 (referring to pragmatism as "the secret story of our courts").
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INTERPRETIVE TOOL USAGE RANKINGS

Balancing Tests Usage Rankings
Survey

Filtered

Unfiltered
Flaum

(3.5%)

Flaum

(3.5%)

Wood, D.

(6.0)

Cudahy

(3.4%)

Cudahy

(1.9%)

Rovner

(5.5)

Manion

(2.9%)
(2.8%)

Kanne

(1.7%)

Flaum

(5.3)

Rovner

Rovner

(1.5%)

Evans

(5.0)

Ripple

(2.7%)

Wood, H.

(1.4%)

Ripple

(5.0)]

Wood, H.

(2.7%)

Evans

(1.4%)

Williams

(4.8)

kanne

(2.6%)

Coffey

(1.3%)

Kanne

(4.7)1

Coffey

(2.4%)

Ripple

(1.3%)

Cudahy

(4.3)

Easterbrook

(2.2%)

Manion

(1.0%)

Wood, H.

(4.0)

Evans

(2.1%)

Bauer

(1.0%)

Bauer

(4.0)

Fairchild

(2.1%)

Williams

(1.0%)

Posner

(3.7)1

Bauer

(2.0%)

Fairchild

(1.0%)

Manion

(3.3)

(1.7%)

Cummings

(0.9%)

Easterbrook

(2.0)

Coffey

(1.0)

uCummings
Wood, D.

(1.6%)

Posner ..

. (1.3%) .

Williams

(1.0%)

Easterbrook

(0.6%)

Posner

(0.4%)

Wood, D.

(0.4%)

Canons of Construction Usage Rankings
Survey

Filtered

Unfiltered
I'Cummings

(3.5%)

Kanne

(1.7%)

Ripple

(5.5)J

Fairchild

Fairchild

(1.4%)

Evans

(5.0)

Manion

(2.9%)
(2.8%)

Manion

(1.3%)

Kanne

(4.7)]

Wood, H.

(2.8%)

Evans

(1.0%)

Flaum

(4.3)

Cudahy

(2.7%)

Cummings

(0.9%)

Wood, D.

(4.3)1

Williams

(2.6%)

Flaum

(0.9%)

Wood, H.

(4.0)

Coffey
Kanne

(2.4%)
(2.2%)

Coffey
Wood, H.

(0.8%)
(0.8%)

Easterbrook
Rovner

(4.0)j
(4.0)

Easterbrook
Posner

(2.1%)
(2.0%)

Ripple
Rovner

(0.7%)
(0.7%)

Williams
Cudahy

(3.8)
(3.7)

Flaum
Ripple

(2.0%)
(1.9%)

Wood, D.
Cudahy

(0.7%)
(0.7%)

Posner
Manion

(3.5)1
(3.3)

Vood, D.
Rovner

(1.8%)
(1.5%)

Easterbrook
Bauer

(0.6%)
(0.5%)

Coffey
Bauer

(3.0)

Evans

(1.4%)

Williams

(0.5%)

Bauer

(1.3%)

Posner

(0.2%)
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Economic Analysis Usage Rankings
Unfiltered

Survey

Filtered

Easterbrook

(3.8%)

Easterbrook

(2.0%)

Posner

(6.8) i

Posner

(2.8%)

Posner

(1.7%)

Easterbrook

(5.9)

Cudahy

(2.5%)

Cudahy

(1.3%)

Wood, D.

(4.3)

Manion

(1.3%)

Flaum

(0.7%)

Kanne

(2.7)

Cummings

(1.2%)

Wood, H.

(0.5%)

_Cudahy

Flaum

(1.2%)

Coffey

(0.4%)

Flaum

(2.0)

Wood, H.

(1.1%)

Cummings

(0.4%)

Evans

(2.0)

Williams

(1.0%)

Bauer

(0.2%)

Ripple

(2.0)

Ripple

(1.0%)

Manion

(0.1%)

Coffey

(2.0)

Wood, D.

(0.9%)

Ripple

(0.1%)

Bauer

(1.7)

Coffey

(0.8%)

Kanne

(0.0%)

Manion

(.7 )

Evans

(0.7%)

Rovner

(0.0%)

Rovner

(1.5)

Rovner

(0.7%)

Evans

(0.0%)

Wood, H.

(1.5)

Bauer

(0.5%)

Williams

(0.0%)

Williams

(1.3)

Fairchild

(0.5%)

Fairchild

(0.0%)

Kanne

(0.4%)

Wood, D.

(0.0%)

___(2.3)1

Legislative History Usage Rankings
Unfiltered

Survey

Filtered
(20.5%)
(udahy

Cummings

(14.2%)

Williams

(6.0)1

Cummings
Wood, H. ..

(19.1%)

Ripple
Cudahy .

(11.3%)

Cudahy

(17.0%)

(11.1%)

Evans

(5.7)
(5.5)

Ripple

(16.5%)

Wood, H.

(10.5%)

Ripple

(5.0)

Posner

(15.3%)

Coffey

(10.4%)

Wood, H.

(5.0)1

Manion

(14.7%)

Posner

(10.3%)

Flaum

(5.0)

Fairchild

(14.6%)

Bauer

(8.6%)

Rovner

(5.0)1

Flaum

(14.2%)

Flaum

(8.5%)

Wood, D.

(5.0)

Coffey

(14.1%)

Fairchild

(8.5%)

Bauer

(4.3)

Bauer

(13.0%)

Manion

(6.4%)

Manion

(4.3)

Easterbrook

(11.1%)

Kanne

(6.3%)

Posner

(4.3)

Easterbrook

(6.1%)

Kanne

(4.0)

Coffey

(3. -0)1

Easterbrook

(2.3)

Williams

(9.2%)

.anne
Rovner

--(9.2%)
(9.0%)

Rovn -er
Williams

(5.9%)
(4.1%)

8.0%)
(7.7%)

Evans
Wood, D.

(3.8%)

,Wood, D.
Evans

(3.3%)
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Original Meaning of the Constitution Usage Rankings
Survey

Filtered

Unfiltered
Posner

(2.4%)

Coffey

(0.9%)

Easterbrook

(5.6)1

Coffey

(1.9%)

Posner

(0.5%)

Ripple

(5.0)

(1.8%)

Kanne

(0.5%)

Kanne

(4.3)

Manion

(1.6%)

Manion

(0.5%)

Evans

(4.0)

Wood, D.

(1.6%)

Bauer

(0.4%)

Flaum(3.3)

Rovner

(1.5%)

Flaum

(0.4%)

Manion

(2.7)

Cudahy

(1.5%)

Easterbrook

(0.4%)

Posner

(2.3)1

Ripple

(1.4%)

Ripple

(0.2%)

Wood, D.

(1.7)

Flaum

(1.3%)

Cummings

(0.2%)

Rovner

(1.5)

Cummings

(1.1%)

Wood, D.

(0.2%)

Wood, H.

(1.0)

Kanne

(1.0%)

Rovner

(0.2%)

Bauer

(1.01

Bauer

(1.0%)

Wood, H.

(0.1%)

Cudahy

(1.0)

Evans

(0.9%)

Cudahy

(0.0%)

Coffey

(1.0)

Wood, H.

(0.9%)

Evans

(0.0%)

Williams

(1.0)

'Fairchild

(0.8%)

Fairchild

(0.0%)

Williams

(0.0%)

Williams

(0.0%)

Iasterbrook

Plain Meaning Rule Usage Rankings
Survey

Filtered

Unfiltered
Manion

(20.5%)

Manion

(10.9%)

Coffey

(7.0)

Ripple

(17.5%)

iWilliams

(17.4%)

Ripple
Coffey

(10.5%)
(10.0%)

Bauer
Easterbrook

(6.0)
(5.9)1

Rovner

(17.2%)

Rovner

(8.6%)

Flaum

(5.3)

Eoffey-

(16.4%)

Flaum

Cudahy

(14.6%)

Kanne

(8.0%)
(7.6%)

IKanne
Ripple

(5.0)1
(5.0)

Flaum

(14.2%)

Bauer

(7.1%)

Manion

(4.7)1

Evans

(11.7%)

Cudahy

(6.6%)

Posner

(4.5)

nood, D.

(11.5%)

Williams

(5.6%)

Wood, D.

(4.0)

Wood, H.

(11.5%)

Wood, D.

(5.1%)

Evans

(4.0)

Kanne

(11.4%)

Wood, H.

(4.9%)

Rovner

(4.0)

Bauer

(11.2%)

Evans

(4.7%)

Cudahy

(3.7)

(9.8%)

Cummings

(4.1%)

Wood, H.

(3.5)1

Fairchild

(6.9%)

Fairchild

(3.2%)

Williams

(2.3)

Easterbrook

(6.6%)

Easterbrook

(1.0%)

Posner

(5.0%)

Posner

(0.3%)

umiings
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Rules Usage Rankings
Unfiltered

Filtered

Survey

Flaum

(6.9%)

Easterbrook

(1.6%)

Coffey

(7.0)

Wood, D.

(5.8%)

Cudahy

(1.4%)

Easterbrook

(6.0)

ooe(5.5-%) -Cudahy

Cummings-

---

-anion
M(.-).

4.7)

(5.1%)

Flaum

(0.9%)

Posner

(4.3)

(5.0%)

Bauer

(0.7%)

Bauer

(4.0)1

Bauer
I(anne

(5.0%)
(4.9%)

Wood, D.
Kanne

(0.7%)
(0.6%)

Wood, H.
Cudahy

(4.0)

Ripple

(4.8%)

Manion

(0.5%)

Kanne

(3.3)

offey

asterbrook

(3.7

(4.6%)

Rovner

(0.5%)

Williams

(3.3)

Wood, H.

(4.4%)

Wood, H.

(0.5%)

Ripple

(3.0)

Cummings
Manion

(4.4%)
(4.3%)

Fairchild
Ripple

(0.5%)

Evans

(3.0)1

(0.5%)

Flaum

(2.7)

lWillms

(4.1%)

Posner

(0.4%)

Rovner

(2.51

Posner

(3.6%)

Coffey

(0.3%)

Wood, D.

(2.0)

Fairchild

(3.1%)

Evans

(0.0%)

Evans

(2.6%)

Williams

(0.0%)

NoTE: The survey number represents the inverse of survey balancing test question
score.
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INTER-CODER RELIABILITY RESULTS

Cohen's kappa Inter-Coder Reliability Results
Actual
Agreement

Expected
Agreement

Cohen's

Std.

Kappa

Error

Z

Prob.>Z

81.25%

53.47%

.5970

.1430

4.17

.0000

69.44%

55.56%

.3125

.1583

1.97

.0242

Dictionaries

90.91%

52.58%

.8083

.1508

5.36

.0000

Economic analysis
Legislative history

83.02%

50.48%

.6571

.1365

4.82

.0000

84.62%

52.37%

.6770

.1369

4.95

.0000

,Original meaning

78.26%

52.27%

.5446

.1313

4.15

.0000

Plain meaning

86.00%

49.20%

.7244

.1359

5.33

.0000

preference for rules

95.00%

86.00%

.6429

.1206

5.33

.0000

Interpretive Tool
Balancing tests
of construction
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REGRESSION RESULTS

Binomial Logistic Regression Results

Variable

Odds
Ratio

Robust
Std.
Err.

z

P> I z

Collegiality

0.964

0.016

-2.230

0.026

0.933

0.996

pist, - ideology

1.000

0.003

0.920

0.995

1.00

Trial court 1

0.823

0.144

-0.100
-1.110

0.267

0.584

1.161

Iria court 2

0.521

0.136

-2.500

0.012

0.313

0.86

Dist. - balancing

0.743

0.134

-1.650

0.098

0.522

1.056

Dist. - dictionaries
Dist. - economic analysis

1.026
0.877

0.078
0.096

0.340
-1.200

0.732
0.230

0.884
0.709

1.191
1.086

ist. - legislative history

0.970

0.032

-0.920

0.359

0.909

1.035
2.099

I

95% Conf.
Interval

Case type - criminal procedure

1.086

0.365

0.534

0.204

-1.640

0.805
0.101

0.562

Ease type - civil rights

0.250

1129
125

Case type - due process

0.959

0.465

-0.090

0.931

0.371

2.478

Iase
-type - unions
Case type - economic activities

0.980

0.488

-0.040

0.967

0.369

2.60f

0.715

0.271

-0.890

0.376

0.341

1.502

Ease type -judicial power

1.517

0.544

0.245

0.75i

.065

1.160

N = 972

Wald chi2(14) = 25.15
Prob > chi2 = 0.0331
Pseudo (McFadden's) R2 =.028
Percent Correctly Predicted=69.1%
Percent Reduction in Error=0.0%
Standard errors adjusted for clustering by case citation.
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Multinomial Logistic Regression Results
Odds
Ratio

Robust
Std. Err.

z

P>I z[

95% Conf.
Interval

JICollegiality

0.950

0.019

-2.550

0.011

0.914

0.98

Distance - ideology

1.003

0.003

1.010

0.313

0.997

1.010

[trial court 1

0.554

0.111

-2.950

0.003

0.375

0.82d

Trial court 2

0.270

0.086

-4.120

0.000

0.145

0.504

Distance

1.083

0.219

0.390

0.695

0.728

1.610

1.015

0.096

0.150

0.879

0.842

1.222

economic analysis

0.854

0.119

-1.130

0.257

0.650

1.122

Distance - legislative history

0.949

0.044

-1.110

0.267

0.866

1.041

Case type - criminal procedure

1.221

0.481

0.510

0.613

0.564

2.641

Case type - civil rights

1.781

0.700

1.470

0.142

0.824

3.848

,Case type - due process

1.369

0.665

0.650

0.518

0.528

3.547

Case type - unions

1.283

0.731

0.440

0.662

0.420

3.922

Case type

1.130

0.479

0.290

0.773

0.493

2.592

1.346

0.570

0.700

0.483

0.587

3.086

1. Concurrence vs. Full agreement

balancing

-

Distance - dictionaries
istnce

-

-

economic activities

Case type -judicial power

2. Concurrence in the judgment vs. Full agreement
Collegiality

0.955

0.028

-1.590

0.112

0.902

1.01

Distance - ideology

1.009

0.005

1.950

0.051

1.000

1.018

[Fria court 1

0.869

0.281

-0.430

0.665

0.461

1.63

Trial court 2

0.696

0.310

-0.810

0.415

0.291

1.665

istance - balancing

1.229

0.358

0.710

0.480

0.694

2.176

Distance - dictionaries

0.876

0.124

-0.940

0.350

0.664

1.156

Iistance - economic analysis

1.138

0.198

0.740

0.457

0.809

1.600

Distance - legislative history

0.922

0.049

0.132

0.830

1.025

'Case type

1.401

0.834

0.570

0.572

0.436

4.500

Case type - civil rights

1.555

0.961

0.710

0.475

0.463

5.219

'Case type - due process

0.973

0.850

0.975

0.176

5.389

Case type - unions

1.371

1.165

0.370

0.711

0.259

7.248

Case type - economic activities

1.841

1.120

1.000

0.316

0.558

6.064

Case type -judicial power

0.357

0.320

0.250

0.062

2.065

-

criminal procedure

-1.510

-0.030

-1.150
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RRR

Robust
Std. Err.

z

P>IzI

895

95% Conf.
Interval

3. Concurrence in part and dissent in part vs. Full agreement
'Collegiality

1.012

0.038

0.310

0.754

0.940

1.090,'

Distance - ideology

1.005

0.006

0.900

0.365

0.994

1.017

Trial court 1

0.290

0.101

-3.540

0.000

0.146

0.576

Trial court 2

0.210

0.119

-2.760

0.006

0.069

0.636

Distance - balancing
Distance - dictionaries

1.105
0.713

0.442
0.141

0.250
-1.710

0,804
0.088

0.504
0.484

2.420,
1.051

Distance - economic analysis

0.742

0.165

-1.340

0.180

0.479

1.148

Distance - legislative history

0.876

0.064

-1.820

0.069

0.760

1.010

aetype - criminal procedure

0.281

0.168

-2.130

0.033

0.087

0.905

Case type - civil rights
vase type - due process

0.473

0.281

-1.260

0.208

0.147

1.517

0.390

0.414

-0.890

0.375

0.049

3.12

Case type - unions

1.498

1.031

0.558

0.388

5.776

Lse type - economic activities
Case type -judicial power

0.420

0.266

-1.370

0.170

0.122

1.45

0.127

0.133

-1.970

0.049

0.016

0.991

-3.540

0.590

4. Dissent vs. Full agreement
ollegiality

0.942

0.016

0.000

0.912

0.974

Distance - ideology

1.003

0.003

0.860

0.387

0.997

1.009

rrial court 1
Trial court 2

0.600
0.291

0.119

-2,580

0,010

0.407

0885

0.077

-4.650

0.000

0.173

0.490

Distance - balancing

0.790

0,159

-1,170

0.241

0.533

1.171i

Distance - dictionaries

0.995

0.081

-0.070

0.948

0.847

1.168

Distance - economic analysis

0.832

0.106

-1.440

0.151

0.648

1.06,

Distance - legislative history

0.933

0.038

-1.690

0.092

0.861

1.011

i9ase type - criminal procedure

1.058

0.271

0.827

0.640

1.747

Case type - civil rights

0.624

0.186

-1.580

0.114

0.347

1.120

ase type - due process
Case type - unions

0.936
1.147

0.332
0.478

-0.190
0.330

0.852
0.742

0.467
0.507

1.87
2.596

Case type - economic activities

0.731

0.212

-1.080

0.281

0.414

1.29

Case type -judicial power

1.306

0.346

0.314

0.777

2.196

0.220

1.010

N = 972

Wald chi2(56) = 118.14
Prob > chi2 = .000

Pseudo (McFadden's) R2=.041
Percent Correctly Predicted=37.7%
Percent Reduction in Error=7.9%
Standard errors adjusted for clustering by case citation.
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CODING MEMORANDUM

To:
From:
Re:

Coding Group
William Ford & Jason Czarnezki
Coding Rules 3.0
CODING RULES

We are looking for evidence that a judge finds a particular interpretive tool useful. The basic coding rule is that we code a reference to
the legal interpretive tool as a "use," provided the reference is not
clearly dicta and the reference is not a rejection of the interpretive
tool's value generally.
Because the coding judgments are highly contextual, the following
rules supplement and clarify the basic rule. Note that cases discussed

below may be non-unanimous decisions that we will not code because
of the date on which they were decided.
1. We do not count a reference to our search terms that has nothing
to do with legal interpretation. For example, the use of a medical
dictionary to define a medical term in a malpractice case solely for
the benefit of the lay reader would not count as a "use" for our
purposes. In this situation, the dictionary is not being used as a legal
interpretive tool (except in the trivial sense that the dictionary is
being used in a legal opinion). Similarly, a reference to legislative
history merely to offer interesting background on a statute would
not count as a "use," since the history is not being used for interpretive purposes. See United States v. Montes, 381 F.3d 631, 634 (7th
Cir. 2004) (opinion by Ripple, J.).
2. We do not count a reference to the interpretive tool if the reference is clearly dicta. For example, the following statement indicates
the reference is clearly dicta: "While the appellant's argument
based on the legislative history is not without merit, the issue is
waived for purposes of this appeal and we do not consider it."
3. We do not count a reference to the interpretive tool if the judge
merely summarizes an argument involving the tool made by someone else, most likely a party but possibly another court, and the
judge offers no indication at all about the positive value or usefulness of the tool. If the reference is arguably positive, such as where
the judge summarizes an argument containing a reference to the
tool and then endorses the argument generally, then we count the
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reference as a use-even if the judge did not specifically endorse
the tool.
4. We do not count an explicit rejection of the interpretive tool. Put
another way, we do not count a reference in which the court says
the interpretive tool is unhelpful generally, such as a statement that
dictionaries, legislative history, or a canon of construction is basically worthless. See Unelko Corp. v. Prestone Products Corp., 116 F.3d
237, 240-41 (7th Cir. 1997) (opinion by Posner, J.) ("But this [discussion of dictionaries] is a sideshow. A dictionary is often and
here useless for deciding a contract dispute. It is just a sampling of
usages, with no pretense to exhaustiveness or to sensitivity to the
full range of nuances that context lends to meaning.") (internal
citation omitted).
The rejection need not be a blanket one, covering all potential
uses of the tool. A reference does not count as a use where the
judge rejects the tool in a substantial range or class of circumstances, including, presumably, the circumstances at issue in the
case. See Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 342-43 (7th Cir.
1997) (opinion by Cudahy, J.) ("[T]he defendants point to the absence of any indication in the legislative history of a congressional
intent to change [the Truth in Lending Act] in 1980; this absence
of comment from the legislative history, they argue, suggests that
the Reform Act amendment only clarified the law.... But divining

congressional intent from an absence of expression is a quagmire
that we must try to avoid."); Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469,
1495 (7th Cir. 1988) (opinion by Easterbrook, J.) ("Another of the
majority's contentions is that we ought to construe [the statute] to
avoid holding it unconstitutional, perhaps even to avoid addressing
constitutional questions about it ....

This canon properly may be

invoked only when a substantial problem coincides with the possibility of fairly reading the statute to avoid that problem. This canon
of construction does not give a court the prerogative to ignore the
legislative will in order to avoid constitutional adjudication.") (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d
700 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussed below). Similarly, in Kramer v. Banc
of America, 355 F.3d 961 (7th Cir. 2004), Judge Manion's opinion
says, "Because the plain language of [the statute] limits its application to specific claims, it is inappropriate to expand the scope of
the statute in reliance on legislative history to include [other]
claims [not specified in the text of the statute]." Id. at 966. While
the reference to plain meaning is coded as a use, the reference to
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legislative history is not, since Judge Manion rejects the use of legislative history in a wide range of circumstances.
5. As a clarification of the previous rule, we do count an attempt to
use the tool even if the tool is unrevealing in the particular case
before the court, what we might call a "failed attempt" to use the
tool. An example is where the court turns to a dictionary or to the
legislative history but concludes the tool does not resolve the dispute. This sort of discussion is plausibly considered an implicit endorsement of the tool's theoretical value. See FirstarBank, N.A. v.
Faul, 253 F.3d 982, 987 (7th Cir. 2001) (opinion by Flaum, J.)
("Unfortunately, [the dictionary] definitions do not provide much
aid in our inquiry . . . these definitions would be a thin reed on
which to rest our decision, given their own vagueness and that most
of the definitions are unhelpful ..... Thus, the ordinary definition
of [the word at issue] does not provide a clear answer to our question."); Commodity Trend Service, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comission, 233 F.3d 981, 989 (7th Cir 2000) (opinion by Flaum, J.)
("The existence of alternative dictionary definitions of a word, each
making some sense under the statute, itself indicates the word is
ambiguous as between the two meanings.") (internal quotation
marks omitted). See also O'Hearn v. Educ. Credit. Mgmt. Corp., 339
F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 2003) ("The key phrase of the statutory provision, 'undue hardship,' is not defined in the statute. Nor does the
legislative history provide meaningful guidance.") (opinion by Ripple, J.); Bob Evans Farms v. NLRB, 163 F.3d 1012, 1019 (7th
Cir.1998) (opinion by Cudahy, J.) ("The Act is silent as to permissible forms of concerted activity, and neither side has directed us to
any legislative history that would provide guidance in defining the
limits of the term."). O'Hearn and Bob Evans Farms are perhaps
close to involving clear dicta, but they suggest the court attempted
to make use of the legislative history.
This clarification dealing with failed attempts likely applies only to
interpretive tools whose use is inherently optional, e.g., dictionaries, legislative history, or the canons of construction. Searches for
original meaning can also fail in this sense and still count for our
purposes. See Trejo v. Shoben, 319 F.3d 878, 890 (7th Cir. 2003)
(opinion by Coffey) (considering a debate between delegates to
the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention but finding the discussion irrelevant to the issue before the court). By contrast, courts
sometimes are required to apply a particular tool, such as a balancing test. A balancing test could not "fail" in the sense meant under
this rule. Where a court actually engages in balancing two conflict-
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ing interests, it must decide upon a winner. It cannot decide the
two interests are in equipoise, such that no one wins the case.
6. An opinion can only count once for a particular interpretive tool,
regardless of the number of positive references to the tool. A single
opinion can, however, count for more than one tool. See Doe v.
Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 509-10 (7th Cir. 2003) (opinion by Manion, J.)
(using both the original meaning of the Constitution and a
dictionary).
7. We count a positive reference to a tool as a use even where the
court is arguably or explicitly following precedent. See Bazan-Reyes
v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2001) (opinion by Kanne, J.)
("Our finding [in a previous case] was based on the dictionary definition as well as the common understanding of the word 'use."').
Our assumption is that where the judge notes the use of the interpretive tool in a prior case and relies on that case, he or she is
implicitly endorsing the use of the tool (at least to some extent).
Thus, where the court relies on a prior case but fails to note the use
of the interpretive tool in the previous case, we do not count this
reference as a use.
8. If a reference is truly difficult or ambiguous and cannot be resolved
under the preceding rules, then we error on the side of counting
the reference to the interpretive tool as a "use."

2006] AN

EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION

901

EXAMPLES OF HARD CASES
Example 1 (Original Meaning and Dictionaries): In Doe v. Heck, Judge
Manion's opinion for the court said,
When the Fourth Amendment was ratified, as now, to
"search" meant "'to look over or through for the purpose of
finding something; to explore; to examine by inspection; as,
to search the house for a book; to search the wood for a
thief."' Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33 n.1 (quoting N. Webster, An
American Dictionary of the English Language 66 (1828) (reprint 6th ed. 1989)).
327 F.3d 492, 509-10 (7th Cir. 2003). While the discussion lacks an
explicit endorsement of originalism and dictionary usage, we count
both references as uses. In the context of the discussion, both references are ambiguous, especially the reference to the dictionary, but
both references are arguably positive.
Regarding the dictionary reference, Judge Manion explicitly notes the
Supreme Court's reliance on the dictionary, which suggests a positive
view of the tool. If he viewed the use of dictionary unfavorably, presumably Judge Manion would not draw attention to the Supreme
Court's implicit endorsement their usage. His reference to the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment is somewhat easier to code,
since he apparently referenced the original meaning to support the
current interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. But to the extent
these references remain ambiguous, they are covered by Rule #8.
Example 2 (Balancing Tests): In Moshe Menora v. Illinois High School
Assoc., 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982), the issue was the Illinois High
School Association's policy of forbidding basketball players from wearing any headgear other than headbands. The Association's concern
was that any other type of headgear might fall off during a game and
someone might trip or slip on it. Orthodox Jewish students challenged the policy as an infringement on their religious freedom to
cover their heads with, for examples, yarmulkes.
Moshe Menora looks like an opportunity for the court to balance individuals' religious freedom against state policy. But Judge Posner's
opinion for the court says, "A court, before attempting to balance competing interests, must define them as precisely as it can, since in the process of definition it may become apparent that there is no real
conflict.... Weigh them and choose we shall if we must, but we want
first to satisfy ourselves that the claims really are irreconcilable." Id. at
1034 (emphasis added). Judge Posner determined that there was no
real conflict between religious freedom and the state's safety con-
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cerns, since yarmulkes could be securely fastened to the players' heads
such that they would be highly unlikely to fall off. While bobby pins
might not be very secure, Judge Posner thinks the players could surely
devise something else. Even though Judge Posner seems to have
solved the problem by directing the parties to find a reasonable solution, he offered a balancing analysis anyway, just in case the state continued to insist that yarmulkes could not be worn. Id. at 1035. While
this balancing analysis was explicitly dicta, it was implicitly a warning
to the state about how the court would balance the interests if forced
to do so.
Moshe Menora is a hard case to code, but it seems analogous to a case
we recently discussed. At our Friday meeting on February l1th, we
discussed Lakin Law Firm, P.C. v. FTC, 352 F.3d 1122 (7th Cir. 2003)
(opinion by Evans, J.). Lakin was also difficult to code, but we decided
it would count as a "use" for our purposes.

We suggested that the Lakin court never actually used a balancing test,
since the appellant, Lakin, failed to identify a public interest. Identifying a public interest is a pre-requisite to balancing. The court said,
Finally, Exemption 6 [of the Freedom of Information Act]
requires a balancing of individual privacy interests of consumer complainants against the public interest in disclosure
to determine whether disclosure is "clearly unwarranted."...
Lakin has failed to carry its burden of "identifying with reasonable specificity the public interest that would be served by
release" of the withheld identifying information.
Id. at 1125 (internal citations omitted). Without an identified public
interest, there was nothing for the court to balance. For this reason,
perhaps this reference to balancing should not count as a "use" for
our purposes.
After much discussion, we decided the reference in Lakin should
count. Arguably, the court did use the balancing test, provided we understand the first part of the balancing test as identifying a public interest. The second half of the test is then to engage in the actual
balancing of the identified interests. If this view of balancing tests is
correct, then the court applied the test; Lakin just failed to identify
something for the court to balance. Additionally, the court's reference
to balancing tests was positive-it certainly did not reject the utility of
balancing tests-which reinforces the conclusion that it should count.
Hence, we decided this reference in Lakin would count as a "use" for
our purposes.
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Now, what about Judge Posner's opinion in Moshe Menora? Maybe
there are three parts to balancing tests. First, identify a conflict (which
in this case was between individuals' private religious practices and the
Association's policy). Second, identify the interests on both sides
(which in this case were the individual's interests in practicing their
religion and the Association's interest in promoting safety). Third,
balance the interests of the two sides (i.e., balance the interests of
religious freedom verses safety). If this is the proper way to conceive of
balancing tests, then Moshe Menora, somewhat like Lakin, simply
failed to identify a true conflict, the first step of the balancing test. Of
course, Moshe Menora, unlike Lakin, really got what it wanted in this
case since the organization's goal was for the high school to change its
policy, which was almost the certain outcome of the court's opinion.
Moshe Menora's goal was not to persuade the court to balance just for
the sake of balancing. The nature of judicial decision-making is our
interest. It was not Moshe Menora's interest.
But Moshe Menora remains difficult. Arguably, Judge Posner cleverly
avoided exactly what we are looking for. Instead of balancing the competing interests, Posner simply told the parties to find a reasonable
solution. And he warned the state that if it failed to adopt a reasonable solution and subsequently forced the court to balance the competing interests in another case, the state would lose.
Despite the difficulties, we error on the side of counting references as
uses and therefore count both Lakin and Moshe Menora as "uses." One
reason is that we cannot give every case the level of deep scrutiny we
have given these cases. A coding scheme that took into account all of
these nuances would soon become unmanageable for any project involving hundreds of cases.
Example 3 (Balancing Tests): In Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700 (7th
Cir. 1987), Judge Posner says a fair amount about balancing tests, but
he actually narrows the opportunities to use them. In this case, Campbell, a prisoner in Illinois, sued the prison officials and guards in a
civil suit for depriving him of his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments. Id. at 701. At the trial, the judge allowed the defendants to ask about Campbell's rape conviction during crossexamination. Campbell appealed and claimed he deserved a new trial,
since the fact of his prior conviction might have affected the jury's
decision. Campbell claimed Rule 603 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
was violated. This rule requires a balancing of the probative value of
the information verses its prejudicial effect "to the defendant." Id. at
703. Campbell was the plaintiff.
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While he could have done so, Judge Posner did not resolve the case
based on a literal reading of the rule. He argues the rule required
some 'judicial patchwork," lest every defendant in a civil suit could
freely introduce evidence about the plaintiffs criminal record while
the plaintiff would have to pass a balancing test to introduce similar
evidence. Such a rule would benefit whichever party happened to be
the defendant, even though it is hardly pre-ordained who will be the
plaintiff and who will be the defendant in a civil suit. So, the court
determined the balancing test applies only in criminal cases. The important point for our purposes is that the court rejected balancing in
the circumstances of the case. When the government attempts to introduce evidence of a defendant's criminal record in a criminal case,
then the court must balance the probative value of the evidence
against its prejudicial effect. In all other cases, including the one
before the court in Campbell, evidence about a criminal record is always admissible under Rule 603. No balancing is needed-or even
allowed.
In this case, Judge Posner expressly limited the permissible opportunities for using a balancing test. For this reason, we cannot plausibly
count this case as a "use."
Example 4 (Legislative History): In Little v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 369

F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 2004), Judge Manion states the Seventh Circuit's
rule for resolving claims that an employer's purported reason for taking some action against an employee is a pretext for unlawful discrimination: The Seventh Circuit's rule is the honest-belief rule: "even if
the business decision was ill-considered or unreasonable, provided
that the decisionmaker honestly believed the nondiscriminatory reason he gave for the action, pretext does not exist." Id. at 1012. In a
footnote, Judge Manion comments that the Sixth Circuit follows a different approach than the Seventh Circuit:
The Sixth Circuit, relying on legislative history, has rejected
the honest-belief rule and required employers to show that
the employer's nondiscriminatory reason not only is honest
but also is "reasonably based on particularized facts." Smith v.
Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 806 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing 136
Cong. Rec. S 7422-03, 7437 (daily ed. June 6, 1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin)). We, however, have declined to follow
this approach. See Flores v. Preferred Tech. Group, 182 F.3d 512,

516 (7th Cir. 1999). The indirect method is, after all, a
means of proving intentional discrimination. Where the employment action is grounded in an honest and permissible
reason, there can be no intent to discriminate unlawfully-
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even if that reason is not reasonably based on particularized
facts.
Id. at 1012 n.3 (emphasis in original). The Sixth Circuit clearly "used"
the legislative history in the sense that matters to us, but what about
the Seventh Circuit? Is this a "failed attempt" at using the legislative
history? While Little is not an easy case, it should not count. Judge
Manion simply summarizes the Sixth Circuit's rule, along with its use

of legislative history, and concludes that its rule does not make sense.
In this context, there is no evidence, implicit or otherwise, that Judge
Manion finds the legislative history useful or helpful. Counter-factually, if the Seventh Circuit had followed the Sixth Circuit's approach,
we would count Little as a use for Judge Manion since he went out of
his way to note the Sixth Circuit's use of legislative history.
Example 5 (Legislative History): In Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 672
(7th Cir. 2003), Judge Easterbrook rejected the reasoning of the
Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Martin, 23 I. & N. Dec. 491
(B.I.A. 2002). In discussing why the Board's decision was unpersuasive
in Martin, he said the following: "Besides starting with legislative history rather than the text of § 16-the Board saw great significance in a
footnote to the Senate Report, though this footnote did not purport
to disambiguate any statutory language and thus lacks weight on the

Supreme Court's view of legislative history's significance-the Board
made two logical errors." In Judge Easterbrook's view, part of the
problem with the Board's decision was its use of legislative history.

Moreover, he said nothing more about the legislative history in his
opinion, instead explaining why the Board's decision was wrong as a
matter of logic. Since Judge Easterbrook's only reference to the legislative history was to fault's the Board's use of it, we do not count it as a
"use" of legislative history.
Example 6 (Legislative History): In Endres v. United States, 349 F.3d
922, 929 (7th Cir. 2003),Judge Ripple, in dissent, criticized the majority for rewriting the statute. According to Judge Ripple, "Not only does
the panel's decision here abandon the analytical framework of [the
prior caselaw], it also ignores the clear language of the statute. It simply blue pencils the reasonable accommodation requirement from the
statute as it applies to police and fire personnel. It relies on no language of the statute, no interpretive regulation, no legislative history."
This reference is arguably in the category of an implicit endorsement
of the tool. It also seems similar to references we are counting that
include only the briefest comment about the legislative history. See
O'Hearn v. Educ. Credit. Mgrnt. Corp., 339 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 2003)
("The key phrase of the statutory provision, 'undue hardship,' is not
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defined in the statute. Nor does the legislative history provide meaningful guidance.") (opinion by Ripple, J.); Bob Evans Farms v. NLRB,
163 F.3d 1012, 1019 (7th Cir.1998) (opinion by Cudahy, J.) ("The Act
is silent as to permissible forms of concerted activity, and neither side
has directed us to any legislative history that would provide guidance
in defining the limits of the term."). This case is a difficult one to
code, but because we error on the side of counting references, we
count this case as a "use" for Judge Ripple.

